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TO BULLY OR NOT TO BULLY:  UNDERSTANDING THE 
ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY IN TRADEMARK 
ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS 
Jessica M. Kiser* 
ABSTRACT 
Companies like Starbucks and Chick-fil-A are routinely labeled trademark 
bullies.  The term “trademark bully” is typically used to describe a large company 
that uses aggressive intimidation tactics and threats of prolonged trademark 
infringement litigation to stop small businesses and individuals from using their 
own trademarks where the stated claims of infringement are likely spurious or non-
existent.  Trademark bullying harms competition and chills the free speech interests 
of those seeking to use trademarks for criticism and parody as permitted by the fair 
use doctrine.  This Article identifies two fundamental causes that interact to 
encourage the aggressive tactics used by trademark bullies.  First, trademark law 
imposes a vague duty on trademark owners to “police” third party trademark use 
for potential infringement.  This uncertain duty renders trademark owners unable 
to accurately predict the risk of harm that third parties pose to their trademarks.  
Secondly, inherent cognitive biases affecting evaluations of such risk lead to 
systematic judgment errors and overestimation of the risk involved, thereby 
encouraging aggressive trademark enforcement. 
This Article uses prospect theory, an empirical social science approach to 
understanding human decision making, to characterize the psychological 
phenomena, including loss aversion and overestimation of risk, that motivate 
trademark bullies.  Prospect theory explains apparently irrational decision making 
by trademark bullies.  Recently proposed solutions for trademark bullying 
mistakenly assume that the trademark bully conducts a rational cost-benefit 
analysis prior to acting.  Better solutions require an understanding of the actual 
psychological processes that underlie these aggressive tactics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Choosing a trademark to represent your business or your product can be a risky 
undertaking.  Consider the example of Jim Clark and the “Charbucks” trademark 
that he selected for one of his coffee products.  In a March 2012 article in New 
Hampshire Magazine, author Jeff Woodburn described Jim Clark’s New 
Hampshire business: 
Along with his wife, Annie, he owns Black Bear Micro-Roastery, a tiny coffee roaster 
in the small town of Tuftonboro on the back side of Lake Winnipesaukee.  They have 
one part-time employee and sales of less than $200,000 annually.  Nearly all of their 
twenty-two specialty roasts are sold online directly to customers and through a few 
stores in northern New England—including the Lebanon Co-op Food Store.  They 
thrive on being small, authentic and responsive to their customers.  Back in 1996, 
some of Clark’s customers asked for a stronger blend.  So on a lark, he made one—so 
strong, Clark admits, “I won’t drink it.”1 
In this quote, Clark is referring to the dark roasted coffee that he began selling 
under a “Charbucks” trademark, a nod to the “charred” coffee beans used in this 
blend.2  This mark3 ultimately led to his company being embroiled in a sixteen-year 
long trademark dispute with the large coffee retailer Starbucks.4  Starbucks 
contacted Clark in 1997 and requested that he cease use of the “Charbucks” mark, 
because they believed that it was infringing upon and diluting the value of their 
famous “Starbucks” mark.5  After years of discussions and settlement proposals 
between Clark, his attorneys and the attorneys for Starbucks, Starbucks brought suit 
against Clark and his business on July 2, 2001.6  Over the next ten years, this case 
went to trial and was appealed and reversed several times.7  The latest decision, 
 
 1. Jeff Woodburn, Starbucks, Charbucks:  Beware of Tangling with Corporate Giants, NEW 
HAMPSHIRE MAGAZINE, Mar. 1, 2012, available at http://www.nhmagazine.com/March-
2012/Starbucks-Charbucks. 
 2. Clark has mentioned that he knew of the connection to Starbucks when he chose the 
“Charbucks” trademark for his coffee.  See Starbucks Litigation—What It’s All About?, THE BLACK 
BEAR MICRO ROASTERY, http://blackbearcoffee.com/resources/99 (last visited July 16, 2013) (“Since 
George felt so strongly that Starbucks ‘over roasted’ all of their coffee, he began to refer to Starbucks as 
‘Charbucks’ extensively.”); see also Letter from Jim Clark, Corp. Rep., Black Bear Micro-Brewery, to 
John Rawls, Att’y Starbucks Corp. (June 5, 2001), available at http://www.blackbearcoffee.com/ 
Starbucks/Faxes&Letters/6-5-01ResponseToRawls.htm (“[T]he term was indeed directed at Starbucks, 
and was indeed meant to be derogatory.”).  Black Bear contends, however, that Charbucks is actually a 
term in common usage in the Coffee industry and the public domain.  Id. (“[T]he term ‘Charbucks’ is 
clearly in the public domain.”); see also Answer & Countercl., Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough 
Coffee, Inc., 2005 WL 3527126 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2005) (No. 01 Civ. 5981), vacated, 477 F.3d 765 
(2d Cir. 2007), available at http://www.blackbearcoffee.com/resources/102 (last visited July 16, 2013) 
(“Charbucks is a widely known and commonly used term in the coffee trade and is meant to refer to the 
very dark roasted coffees made popular by west coast coffee purveyors.”). 
 3. The words “trademark” and “mark” will be used interchangeably throughout this article. 
 4. Starbucks Litigation—What It’s All About?, supra note 2. 
 5. See Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 2005 WL 3527126, at *3; see also Starbucks Litigation—
What It’s All About?, supra note 2. 
 6. See History of Events—Starbucks Litigation, THE BLACK BEAR MICRO ROASTERY 
http://blackbearcoffee.com/resources/100 (last visited July 16, 2013). 
 7. There have been three victories for Black Bear in the District Court for the Southern District 
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from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, came down on November 
15, 2013 in favor of Clark and his Black Bear Micro-Roastery.8  The court held that 
Starbucks had not met its burden of proving that the “Charbucks” mark, as it is 
consistently used in connection with the “Black Bear Micro Roastery” mark and 
logo, dilutes the famous “Starbucks” mark in violation of the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act.9  
 For a somewhat similar scenario involving a large corporation in a trademark 
dispute with a much smaller business, one only has to look to the “Eat More Kale” 
dispute.  Bo Muller-Moore is a Vermont folk artist and small-scale T-shirt designer 
who received a cease and desist letter in 2006 from Chick-fil-A, a nearly national 
fast food chain.10  Chick-fil-A demanded that Muller-Moore stop selling one of his 
T-shirt designs, alleging that the slogan on the shirt—”Eat More Kale”—infringed 
upon their “Eat Mor Chikin” mark.11  After receiving a letter from Muller-Moore’s 
pro bono counsel explaining the small scale of Muller-Moore’s T-shirt business, 
including the fact that the shirts were primarily sold at a Montpelier, Vermont 
farmer’s market, Chick-fil-A appeared to have allowed the matter to drop.12  Then, 
Muller-Moore filed a trademark application with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) on August 31, 2011 for his “Eat More Kale” 
trademark.13 
This trademark application prompted Chick-fil-A to resume its dispute with 
Muller-Moore by sending a new cease and desist letter in October 2011, again 
demanding that Muller-Moore cease use of the “Eat More Kale” mark, abandon his 
trademark application, and transfer his eatmorekale.com domain name to Chick-fil-
A.14  Chick-fil-A noted in this letter that it had already successfully stopped third 
 
of New York.  The first and second victories were met with an appeal to the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in which Starbucks Corp. was victorious in having the case remanded.  The latest victory by 
Black Bear was affirmed on appeal.  See Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 2005 WL 3527126, at *3, 
vacated, 477 F.3d 765 (2d Cir. 2007), remanded to 559 F. Supp. 2d 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009), remanded to No. 01 Civ. 5981, 2011 WL 6747431 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2011), aff’d, No. 12-364, 2013 WL 6037227 (2d Cir. Nov. 15, 2013). 
 8. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., No. 12-364, 2013 WL 6037227 (2d Cir. 
Nov. 15, 2013). 
 9. Id. (“[Starbucks] has failed to carry its burden of proving that [Black Bear]’s use of its marks, 
as evidenced on the record before the Court, is likely to cause dilution by blurring.”). 
 10. Dan D’Ambrosio, ‘Eat More Kale’ Trademark Flap More Complex Than Simple Slogan, 
BURLINGTONFREEPRESS.COM (Nov. 24, 2011), http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/article/20111124/ 
BUSINESS08/111240307/-Eat-More-Kale-trademark-flap-more-complex-than-simple-slogan; see also 
Jess Bidgood, Chicken Chain Says Stop, but T-Shirt Maker Balks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2011, at A12, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/05/us/eat-more-kale-t-shirts-challenged-by-chick-fil-a. 
html?_r=1&.   
 11. D’Ambrosio, supra note 10. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,412,053 (filed Aug. 31, 2011), available at 
http://tsdr.uspto.gov; see also Pete Mason, The Difference Between “Eat More Kale” and “Eat Mor 
Chikin,” HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (May 3, 2012, 5:05 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pete-
mason/eat-more-kale_b_1469661.html (stating that Muller-Moore sought registration of the trademark 
as a way of combating “online copycats”). 
 14. D’Ambrosio, supra note 10. 
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parties from using marks such as “Eat More Goat” and “Eat More Beer.”15  Muller-
Moore’s pro bono counsel refused Chick-fil-A’s demands, noting that there is no 
likelihood of confusion between Muller-Moore’s handmade T-shirts and Chick-fil-
A’s fast food chain, especially in light of the fact that the closest Chick-fil-A 
location to Muller-Moore’s home business is 120 miles away in New Hampshire.16  
Unlike Clark, who selected the “Charbucks” mark for his coffee while aware of the 
more famous “Starbucks” mark, Muller-Moore claimed to have never heard of 
Chick-fil-A’s “Eat Mor Chikin” advertising campaign; instead, he made the first 
“Eat More Kale” shirt at the request of a fellow farmer’s market vendor that grew 
and sold kale.17  Despite the fact that an Office Action from the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) dated December 18, 2011 stated that the attorney 
reviewing Muller-Moore’s “Eat More Kale” trademark application noted no 
“similar registered or pending marks that would bar registration,”18 Muller-Moore’s 
application was flagged to be reviewed again on December 21, 2011 after an 
anonymous party filed a Letter of Protest with the USPTO.19  On March 27, 2012, 
and again on March 7, 2013, the USPTO sent Muller-Moore Office Actions 
refusing the registration of his “Eat More Kale” mark based on a likelihood of 
confusion with Chick-fil-A’s various “Eat More Chikin” trademark registrations.20  
Because Muller-Moore may still respond to this last Office Action, his trademark 
application is still pending.  Additionally, Muller-Moore seems eager to win this 
 
 15. Id.; see also Krystal Allan, Chick-Fil-A Threatens to Sue Ocean Springs Bar, WLOX.COM, 
http://www.wlox.com/story/11423722/chick-fil-a-threatens-to-sue-ocean-springs-bar (last updated Nov. 
2, 2009). 
 16. D’Ambrosio, supra note 10. 
 17. Bidgood, supra note 11; see also D’Ambrosio, supra note 10. 
 18. Letter from Caryn Glasser, Trademark Examining Att’y, United States Patent and Trademark 
Office 108, to Robert Muller-Moore (Dec. 18, 2011), available at http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer? 
caseId=sn85412053&docId=OOA20111218185952#page=1. 
 19. Memorandum from Charles G. Joyner, Trademark Examining Att’y, Office of the Deputy 
Comm’r for Trademark Examination Policy, to Andrew D. Lawrence, Trademark Examining Att’y, 
United States Patent and Trademark Office 108 (Dec. 22, 2011), available at 
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn85412053&docId=ADR20111222172742#docIndex=12
&page=1.  It seems clear to some parties following this dispute that Chick-fil-A is likely behind this 
Letter of Protest.  Steve Baird, on his DuetsBlog, opined that Chick-fil-A may have utilized the Letter of 
Protest as a way to quietly solve this trademark dispute in light of all of the bad press they have received 
based on their cease and desist letters to Muller-Moore.  See Steve Baird, Chick-fil-A Goes Stealth in 
“Eat More Kale” Trademark Dispute?, DUETS BLOG (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.duetsblog.com/2012/ 
03/articles/trademarks/chick-fil-a-goes-stealth-in-eat-more-kale-trademark-dispute/. 
 20. Letter from Caryn Glasser, Trademark Examining Att’y, United States Patent and Trademark 
Office 108, to Daniel P. Richardson, Att’y for Applicant Robert Muller-Moore, Tarrant, Gillies, 
Merriman & Richardson (Mar. 27, 2012), available at http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn 
85412053&docId=OOA20120327153956#docIndex=10&page=1; Letter from Andrew D. Lawrence, 
Managing Att’y, United States Patent and Trademark Office 108, to Daniel P. Richardson, Att’y for 
Applicant Robert Muller-Moore, Tarrant, Gillies, Merriman & Richardson (Mar. 7, 2013), available at 
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn85412053&docId=OOA20130307115404#docIndex=5
&page=1.  This second Office Action came after Muller-Moore’s pro bono counsel filed a Response to 
the March 27, 2012 Office Action disputing any likelihood of confusion.  In addition to citing the 
likelihood of confusion with the Chick-fil-A registrations, this March 7, 2013 Office Action also noted 
that the slogan “Eat More Kale” may be mere ornamentation on the shirts rather than a trademark under 
which the shirts are sold.  This provided another basis for rejection of the trademark application.  Id. 
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battle; he has routinely turned to the press to publicize his dispute with Chick-fil-
A,21 and he is currently participating in the production of a documentary, titled “A 
Defiant Dude,” that will feature his story and examine trademark bullying by large 
corporations against individuals and small businesses.22  Of course, Jim Clark’s 
battle with Starbucks has been going on much longer than the “Eat More Kale” 
dispute.  Despite his persistence through the numerous appeals of his case, Jim 
Clark’s advice to Muller-Moore and others similarly situated would be, “[S]ettle. 
Get it behind you. It’s been a nightmare.”23 
Disputes like the ones above are the reason that companies like Starbucks and 
Chick-fil-A are called “trademark bullies.”24  Trademarkia, a web-based company 
that assists users in searching for existing trademark registrations and in filing 
trademark applications,25 has begun tracking trademark oppositions in order to 
publish lists of the most aggressive “trademark bullies” – those companies that file 
the largest number of oppositions against third party trademark applications and 
who use extended opposition tactics to delay federal approval of such 
applications.26  Companies like Monster Energy Company, E. & J. Gallo Winery, 
McDonald’s Corporation, Anheuser-Busch, LLC and Facebook, Inc. topped 
Trademarkia’s list of trademark bullies for 2012.27 
While several scholars and the media have begun to publicize and discuss the 
issue of trademark bullying,28 most of the attention on this potential problem has 
focused on how to “shame” or punish the trademark bully, or on how to embolden 
the perceived victim (such as through the creation of antiSLAPP legislation that 
 
 21. See D’Ambrosio, supra note 10; see also Mason, supra note 13; Bidgood, supra note 10. 
 22. James Lantz & Robert Muller-Moore, A Defiant Dude, KICK STARTER, http://www.kick 
starter.com/projects/1674889308/a-defiant-dude (last visited July 18, 2013). 
 23. Woodburn, supra note 1. 
 24. See generally Lantz & Muller-Moore, supra note 22 (using the term “trademark bullies”); see 
also Baird, supra note 19; Woodburn, supra note 1 (describing Clark as “motivated by an inward 
determination to not be bullied by a big corporation”). 
 25. About Trademarkia, LEGAL FORCE TRADEMARKIA, http://www.trademarkia.com/about-
trademarkia/about-us.aspx (last visited July 29, 2013). 
 26. Rip Empson, New Trademarkia Feature Exposes Biggest Trademark Bullies;  Apple, Zynga 
Among Top Five, TECHCRUNCH.COM, http://techcrunch.com/2012/01/24/new-trademarkia-feature-
exposes-biggest-trademark-bullies-apple-zynga-among-top-five (last visited July 29, 2013). 
 27. Biggest Bullies, LEGAL FORCE TRADEMARKIA, http://www.trademarkia.com/opposition/ 
opposition-brand.aspx (last visited July 29, 2013). 
 28. See, e.g., Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853 (Summer 2012); Jeremy N. Sheff, Fear and Loathing in Trademark 
Enforcement, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 873 (Summer 2012); Leah C. Grinvald, 
Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625 (2011); Sara M. Andrzejewski, “Leave Little Guys 
Alone!”:  Protecting Small Businesses from Overly Litigious Corporations and Trademark Infringement 
Suits, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 117 (Fall 2011); Anderson Cooper 360° (CNN television broadcast Nov. 
29, 2011), available at http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2011/11/29/video-the-ridiculist-chick-fil-a-battles-t-
shirt-guy/; Kirk Carapezza, Chicken Vs. Kale:  Artist Fights Chick-fil-A Suit, NPR (Dec. 6, 2011) 
available at http://www.npr.org/2011/12/06/143195033/chicken-vs-kale-vt-artist-fights-chick-fil-a-suit; 
Angus Loten, New Tool in Trademark Fights:  Start-Ups “Shame” Bigger Companies; “Coming Down 
Hard on the Little Guy,” WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 23, 2012, at B5, available at http://online.wsj. 
com/article/SB10001424052970203358704577237473534179392.html (discussing small business 
strategy in making these matters public and the desired effects of shaming). 
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allows defendants to seek damages upon proof that a plaintiff filed a meritless 
suit).29  This Article seeks to examine the reasons that may underlie the aggressive 
tactics of trademark bullies—a necessary step in understanding how best to address 
the problem.  Part I of this Article provides background on trademark bullying and 
the potential problematic results of such trademark enforcement tactics.  Part II of 
the Article explores the potential legal reasons for the aggressive and costly actions 
taken by trademark bullies, including the role played by trademark law’s “duty to 
police” in encouraging bully-like behavior.  Part III then attempts to explain 
bullying behavior, in light of the duty to police one’s trademark, using prospect 
theory and cognitive bias research into the psychological basis for human 
reasoning, decision making and risk avoidance.  The Article concludes by 
explaining that current proposals to address trademark bullying are insufficient 
because they neglect to address the often unconscious psychological mechanisms at 
work that likely encourage a trademark bully to behave irrationally.  To overcome 
the hurdle posed by such irrationality, steps must be taken by legislators or 
attorneys to clarify the trademark duty to police and the true risk of abandonment 
of one’s trademark.  For the purposes of this Article, the term “trademark bully” 
will refer to a company that takes aggressive steps to enforce its trademark rights 
against another company or individual where the legal claims are likely spurious or 
unenforceable. 
I.  THE TRADEMARK BULLYING PROBLEM 
Most scholarship on the topic of trademark bullying has focused solely on large 
companies taking action against smaller companies or unsophisticated 
individuals.30  While trademark bullying disputes reported in the press and in 
scholarship typically play out in this large entity against small entity dichotomy, 
such a distinction is not necessary for the purposes of this Article.  Instead, the 
aggressive—and potentially very costly and inefficient—actions taken by the 
trademark holder are the key to labeling such individuals or companies as 
 
 29. See, e.g., Grinvald, supra note 29; Manta, supra note 29 (discussing judicial sanctions that 
might be used to punish trademark bullies whose tactics “rise to the level of intimidation or 
harassment”); Andrzejewski, supra note 29 (arguing that publicity of cease and desist letters or the use 
of antiSLAPP legislation or “threat actions” could punish trademark bullies and reduce the incidence of 
bullying); see also Frequently Asked Questions (and Answers) About Chilling Effects, CHILLING 
EFFECTS, http://www.chillingeffects.org/faq.cgi (last visited July 18, 2013) (This “project invites 
recipients and senders of cease and desist notices to send them to a central point (here, at 
chillingeffects.org) for analysis, and to browse the website for background information and explanation 
of the laws they are charged with violating or enforcing.”). 
 30. See, e.g., Grinvald, supra note 29, at 642 (“There are four elements in this Article’s bullying 
definition, which are discussed in turn below:  (1) unreasonable interpretation of rights, (2) intimidation 
tactics, (3) the trademark holder is a large corporation, and (4) the accused infringer is a small business 
or individual.”); Manta, supra note 29, at 854 (“Simply stated, a trademark bully is usually a large 
company that seeks to put an end to behavior by individuals and small businesses that it perceives as a 
danger to its own intellectual property even though its legal claims against these other parties are 
spurious or non-existent.”). 
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“trademark bullies.”31  
Typically, an incident of trademark bullying starts with a cease and desist 
(“C&D”) letter sent from an owner of an established trademark to an individual or 
business with a vaguely similar mark.  This was true of the “Charbucks” and “Eat 
More Kale” disputes discussed above. Each trademark bully may have learned of 
the other mark through the other party’s official application for registration of the 
trademark with the USPTO.32  They may have learned about the mark from an 
employee or customer who encountered a product bearing the trademark in the 
marketplace, or possibly through a general Internet search.33  The perceived victim 
of bullying could be a well-funded commercial enterprise, but it could just as easily 
be an individual with a small, local, home-based business.  The Internet has made it 
relatively easy to find third parties using arguably similar trademarks without 
regard to the geographic or commercial scope of the use or the sophistication of the 
mark’s owner.  Often the C&D letters sent by the bullies threaten legal sanctions if 
certain demands are not met.  Those demands may include immediate cessation of 
use of the allegedly infringing trademark, the transfer of the infringing owner’s 
website domain name to the bully, and the destruction of all potentially infringing 
products, marketing materials and even packaging and business stationery.  
Sometimes such letters detail how the allegedly infringing party has violated the 
trademark rights of the bully, but often the letters are vague and filled with 
confusing legalese and idle threats. 
 
 31. Additionally, the term “bully” is clearly pejorative and, when used against the backdrop of the 
current media discussion of the bullying of children and adolescents online and in schools, directs 
potentially unearned ire at the alleged trademark bully.  In this Article, I will use the terms “trademark 
bully” and “bullying victim” or “bullying target” for both ease of reference and to connect such 
discussions to earlier scholarship on trademark bullying in general; however, as is discussed below, 
trademark bullying may result more from our uncertain trademark laws and unconscious psychological 
biases than from aggressive intent on the part of the bully.  While the negative repercussions of 
trademark bullying are to be disparaged, the bully itself may not have earned the shame directed at it. 
 32. The USPTO makes all trademark applications publically available on its website and 
distributes printed publications containing trademarks at various stages of the application process.  See 
Jessica M. Kiser, How Dykes on Bikes Got It Right:  Procedural Inequities Inherent in the Trademark 
Office’s Review of Disparaging Trademarks, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (Summer 2011) (“If accepted by 
the examiner, the trademark application will be published in the Official Gazette.  This publication 
provides notice to third parties of the USPTO’s intent to allow federal registration for such trademark 
and allows such third parties an opportunity to formally oppose the registration.  An unopposed 
trademark will then receive its federal registration and will appear on the Principal Register thirty days 
after its publication date.”). 
 33. William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow of IP Law, 28 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 453, 470 (2012) (discussing interviews with attorneys 
about how they became aware of potential trademark infringement:  “Some of the study lawyers stated 
they had paralegals monitor the Internet or use commercial trademark ‘watch’ services to discover 
potential infringers for clients with large trademark portfolios.  More frequently, the clients themselves 
identified potential claims. These clients learned of potential claims in various ways.  Clients with large 
trademark portfolios often have in-house staff monitor for infringement online.  One example cited by a 
study attorney was a large client who dedicated several staff members to search the Internet for alleged 
trademark and copyright infringement.  Several attorneys also gave as example situations wherein 
clients’ sales staff became aware of potential infringements while attending industry trade shows or 
conferences, or from learning of instances of actual consumer confusion between their employer’s and a 
competitor’s products or services when dealing with customers”). 
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The recipient of a C&D letter is faced with the daunting task of determining the 
merits of such vague claims in order to make a reasoned response.  The problem is 
that trademark infringement cases are notoriously fact-specific.  Because 
“[l]ikelihood of confusion, the test for trademark infringement, is considered an 
issue of fact at the trial level,” it is “hard to determine with very real certainty how 
future courts will use prior cases.”34  This lack of certainty and dearth of good 
precedential cases makes it difficult for the bullying targets to respond based on the 
legal merits of their possible infringement defenses; rather, they often respond 
based on their own financial ability to defend the dispute in the first place.  
Additionally, this lack of clarity and predictability in the law encourages trademark 
bullying.  An experienced attorney may be able to rely on prior experience and 
anecdotal evidence to judge the costs associated with the dispute, but he is unlikely 
to be able to tell a client with any certainty that a claim is meritless (regardless of 
whether such client is the potential plaintiff or defendant).35  Thus, trademark 
bullying can only rarely be described as meritless and is often better described as 
unnecessary, inefficient and economically irrational.36 
Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy took up the charge against trademark bullies in 
2010 when he introduced a bill, The Trademark Law Technical and Conforming 
Amendment Act Of 2010 (S. 2968), that called for a mandatory study by the 
Department of Commerce to report on “the extent to which small businesses may 
be harmed by litigation tactics by corporations attempting to enforce trademark 
rights beyond a reasonable interpretation.”37  This was a direct response to the very 
public dispute in the Senator’s home state of Vermont between Hansen Beverage 
Company, makers of the “Monster Energy” trademarked energy drinks, and Rock 
Art Brewery, a small Vermont brewing company that released a beer under the 
trademark “Vermonster.”38  In that instance, Rock Art Brewery received a 
threatening C&D letter from Hansen Beverage Company but was able to appeal to 
social media in order to “shame” Hansen Beverage Company into agreeing to a 
relatively neutral settlement agreement.39 
The result of Senator Leahy’s efforts was the “Report to Congress:  Trademark 
Litigation Tactics and Federal Government Services to Protect Trademarks and 
 
 34. Grinvald, supra note 29, at 658. 
 35. See Gallagher, supra note 34, at 485 (“Revealingly, the lawyers were loath to self-identify as 
bullies but did admit that they sometimes engaged in aggressive enforcement tactics, most often 
identified as sending demand letters that over-stated their client’s rights or potential remedies, sending a 
complaint, and taking very aggressive and unyielding positions in negotiations.  When asked whether 
they had ever enforced trademark or copyright claims the lawyers believed were weak, many of the 
interviewed lawyers responded that they had.”). 
 36. Of course, sometimes lawyers might not even care about the merits of a case.  See id. at 
486 (“The lawyer on the other side was yelling at me about how we didn’t have a case, and I said you 
must be confusing me with somebody who cares about the merits.  We are the giants in this case and 
we’ve decided we’re not going to tolerate this, we’re not going to give up.”). 
 37. Trademark Technical and Conforming Amendment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-146, 124 
Stat. 66 (2010). 
 38. See ‘Little Guy’ Wins Goliath Vermonster Battle, ABC13 NEWS (Oct. 22, 2009), http://abc 
local.go.com/ktrk/story?section=news/bizarre&id=7078063. 
 39. Id. 
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Prevent Counterfeiting” (the “Report to Congress”) that the USPTO published in 
April 2011.40  This report was based on comments received from the public during 
a period of four months.  According to the report, “The seventy-nine comments 
received reflected a diverse range of views, yet few explicitly addressed whether 
and to what extent trademark abuse is a significant problem.”41  Despite receiving 
only seventy-nine comments from the public, and recognizing that very few of 
those comments directly answered the question being asked, the USPTO somehow 
determined that trademark bullying can best be addressed by the current safeguards 
in the private litigation system.42  This conclusion has been widely criticized.43  
Eric Goldman, Professor of Intellectual Property Law at Santa Clara University 
School of Law, even went so far as to call the report “worthless.”44  Overall, the 
report recommends that members of the private bar be encouraged to take on more 
pro bono cases to help any potential bullying victims that may not be able to afford 
counsel on their own.45  In a similar vein, Jason Vogel and Jeremy A. Schachter, 
both practicing attorneys, recently published an article on trademark bullying in the 
International Trademark Association’s The Trademark Reporter.46  Their article 
also argues that the trademark bullying problem can be managed without new 
legislation:  instead, existing legal ethics rules can be utilized to deter and punish 
bullying behavior in both the litigation and prelitigation stages of a dispute.47  
While there is disagreement about whether trademark bullying is a widespread 
problem,48 it is clearly a costly problem with potentially dire consequences for the 
parties involved in each bullying dispute. 
A.  THE COST OF TRADEMARK BULLYING TO SMALL BUSINESSES 
When discussing the costs of trademark bullying to the bullying victim, small 
businesses become the logical focus of the discussion.  When the target of bullying 
 
 40. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK LITIGATION TACTICS AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
SERVICES TO PROTECT TRADEMARKS AND PREVENT COUNTERFEITING (2011), available at http://www. 
uspto.gov/ip/TMLitigationReport_final_2011April27.pdf. 
 41. Id. at 1. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., Lara Pearson, USPTO Reports to Congress on Trademark Bullying, (April 28, 
2011), http://brandgeek.net/2011/04/28/uspto-reports-congress-trademark-bullying/; Eric Goldman, 
Department of Commerce Releases Worthless Report on Trademark Bullying, ERIC GOLDMAN (April 
29, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/04/department_of_c.htm. 
 44. Goldman, supra note 44. 
 45. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE,supra note 41. 
 46. Jason Vogel & Jeremy A. Schachter, How Ethics Rules Can Be Used to Address Trademark 
Bullying, 103 TRADEMARK REP. 503 (2013). 
 47. Id. at 503–05. 
 48. The results of the Report to Congress and the opinion expressed in the Vogel and Schachter 
article are countered by the empirical data collected and analyzed by Professor Kenneth L. Port.  
Professor Port’s view that trademark bullying is a widespread and increasing problem was expressed in 
an open letter directed to Dir. David Kappos of the USPTO explaining how Port’s data shows the 
increasing use of trademark litigation for the purpose of bullying or extortion.  Kenneth L. Port, Open 
Letter to Director David Kappos of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (Feb. 18, 2011), 
available at http://web.wmitchell.edu/cybaris/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Port-Letter.pdf. 
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is a large corporation, that corporation is likely to have the resources to defend 
itself more fully, including easy access to an attorney to respond to a C&D letter.  
A large corporation is also likely to have a sophisticated understanding of the role 
the C&D letter plays in the dispute process.  Professor Leah Chan Grinvald has 
explained that “the rational corporation would likely call the bluff of the 
threatening company because the rational corporation knows that only 3 percent of 
all threats of litigation end up in court.”49  However, a small business will often 
agree to cease use of its trademark, viewing that option as the least expensive 
choice. 
Changing one’s trademark can still be an expensive proposition.  If the 
trademark is also the name of the business, the bullying victim may need to consult 
with counsel about amending or filing for new licenses and incorporation 
documents with its state.  Most bullies also demand that the bullying victim destroy 
all inventory, marketing materials and even packaging supplies bearing the 
offending trademark.50  It will not be cheap to replace these goods, which will be 
needed immediately to continue operation of the business, and it is unlikely that 
these kinds of expenses would be accounted for in a small business’s regular 
budget.  Additionally, a young business will have invested a lot of its initial capital 
into advertising and the development of goodwill around the company’s business 
name or trademark.  All of that investment will be lost, and those expenses will 
need to be duplicated.  Trademark disputes, like the ones facing Jim Clark and Bo 
Muller-Moore, greatly increase the likelihood that a small business will fail.51 
A trademark bully is likely to recognize that his target is in such a precarious 
position.  In Professor William Gallagher’s interviews with trademark and 
copyright counsel, he found  
that [the attorneys] were well aware that asserting claims against a smaller company 
was often easier than targeting a larger company.  The lawyers stated that smaller 
companies generally could not effectively resist a trademark or copyright claim or 
threatened lawsuit due to the high cost of IP legal proceedings, regardless of the legal 
 
 49. Grinvald, supra note 29, at 654 (“However, small businesses and individuals have neither the 
infrastructure of large corporations to analyze trademark-infringement claims for validity nor the 
monetary resources to bluff out would-be bullies.”).   
 50. See, e.g., Letter from Assistant General Counsel, Trademarks & Copyrights Legal 
Department, to Abdul Popal, Intellectual Property Rights Agent (Nov. 19, 2001), available at 
http://chillingeffects.org/trademark/notice.cgi?action=image_5 (“Accordingly, we demand that 
CafePress.com immediately and permanently cease supplying, directly or indirectly, any merchandise 
bearing the Verizon Logo or any portion thereof, including any similar logos, to any third party, 
including, but not limited to Despot, and destroy any and all such merchandise currently in 
CafePress.com’s possession, control or custody.”); Letter from Volkswagen of America, Inc., to 
Affordable Adornments (Oct. 2, 2007), available at http://chillingeffects.org/trademark/notice.cgi? 
NoticeID=15590 (“Immediately turn over to Volkswagen for destruction all unauthorized products, 
packaging, labels, and products displaying, incorporating, using, or bearing any Volkswagen 
trademark.”). 
 51. Leah C. Grinvald, Resolving the IP Disconnect for Small Businesses, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1491, 
1499 (Summer 2012) (“For example, due to expanded trademark rights, small businesses face an 
increasing threat from trademark bullies that threaten litigation, which if instituted could cause the 
targeted victims to enter into bankruptcy.”). 
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sophistication of the target or their lawyers.52 
The Report to Congress envisions increased access to pro bono counsel as the 
solution to aid these small businesses, but this proposal is shortsighted.  The small 
business owner would first have to be sophisticated enough to know how to obtain 
pro bono counsel and would have to be confident enough in its own resources and 
abilities to decide to consider fighting, rather than capitulating immediately.  Even 
prior to taking his dispute to trial, Jim Clark incurred over $10,000 in legal fees 
simply from his attempts to negotiate a settlement agreement with Starbucks.53  He 
was only able to afford to defend the case in court after he was informed that his 
commercial insurance policy would cover the costs once a suit requesting damages 
was filed against him.54  Most small businesses would simply not have the ability 
to defend themselves or to risk waiting for help from pro bono counsel. 
However, the public and media backlash against trademark bullying has led to 
an interesting change of fortune in some instances.  By publicizing its trademark 
dispute with Hansen Beverage Company, Rock Art Brewery obtained a lot of free 
publicity.55  It garnered the support of a Vermont senator and benefitted from 
increased sales even after the dispute was settled.56  After learning of the “Eat More 
Kale” dispute, Vermont Governor Peter Shumlin said in December 2011 that the 
state would do all it could to help Muller-Moore in his battle against Chick-fil-A.57  
It is unlikely that Bo Muller-Moore would be the subject of an upcoming 
documentary or touring festivals across the country selling his shirts were it not for 
the publicity surrounding Chick-fil-A’s alleged trademark bullying in the first 
place.58  Of course, the typical trademark bullying victim is unlikely to fare so well. 
B.  THE COSTS BORNE BY THE TRADEMARK BULLY 
While it is easy to focus solely on the costs borne by the victim of trademark 
bullying, the bully faces a number of costs as well.  Being a trademark bully can 
 
 52. Gallagher, supra note 34, at 478. 
 53. See History of Events—Starbucks Litigation, supra note 6 (As of June 26, 2000, “total 
expenses were now well in excess of $10,000.”  The actual lawsuit was not filed until July 2, 2001.). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., Monster Threatens ‘Vermonster’ Beer Brewer, NBCNEWS.COM, http://www.nbc 
news.com/id/33282954/ns/business-small_business/t/monster-threatens-vermonster-beer-brewer (Oct. 
12, 2009); Tammy Tuck & Bruce Falconer, A True Monster Attacks Rock Art Brewery—Can Twitter 
and Facebook Help?, WASHINGTON CITY PAPER (Oct. 15, 2009),  http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com 
/blogs/youngandhungry/2009/10/15/a-true-monster-attacks-rock-art-brewery-can-twitter-and-facebook-
help/; Bianca Slota, Monster Problem for Rock Art,WCAX.COM (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.wcax.com/ 
story/11291060/monster-problem-for-rock-art. 
 56. See Josh Spiro, A Besieged Brewery Fights Back, INC. (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.inc.com/ 
news/articles/2009/10/vermonster.html (“[T]he store sold 120 bottles of Vermonster in a weekend 
compared to the 20 to 30 they usually sell in an entire week.”). 
 57. Vt.’s “Eat More Kale” Gets a Preliminary “No,” VALLEY NEWS, Apr. 23, 2013, at B1, 
available at http://www.vnews.com/news/state/region/5835298-95/vts-eat-more-kale-gets-preliminary-
no. 
 58. See Robert Muller-Moore, About Eat More Kale, EATMOREKALE.COM, http://eatmorekale. 
com/about.html (last visited July 20, 2013) (“Now I spend my summers traveling to various food and 
music festivals in the Northeast handing out stickers and spreading the word.”). 
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certainly be expensive—the trademark bully faces numerous direct and indirect 
costs related to its aggressive enforcement of its trademark rights.  These 
companies incur these costs because they place substantial value on their 
trademarks:  in some cases a company’s trademark, or its combined trademark 
portfolio, can represent a substantial portion of the company’s net worth.  For 
example, Brand Finance, a consulting company that prepares brand valuations for 
tax, accounting, legal and other corporate purposes, has calculated the value of 
Apple’s brand, and thus its trademark portfolio and related goodwill, at nearly $71 
billion for 2012.59  Brand Finance determined Google’s 2012 brand value to be 
over $47 billion.60  With such valuable assets presumed to be at stake, companies 
allocate a substantial amount of money to trademark enforcement and protection. 
The party enforcing, or overenforcing, its trademark rights, must pay attorneys 
for correspondence and negotiations with the bullying victim, as well as potentially 
for “watch services” to find third parties to bully in the first place.  According to a 
survey of intellectual property attorneys conducted and analyzed by the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association, the average billing rate for such an attorney 
was $340 per hour.61  Trademark monitoring watch reports are prepared by third 
parties, like Corsearch, CPA Global and Thomson CompuMark that monitor the 
marketplace for possible infringement of a client’s trademark.62  They routinely 
search the records of state and federal trademark registers, domain name registrars, 
business name registration databases, and other sources.  Companies like Mark 
Monitor, Cyberveillance and BD Brand Protect also monitor the Internet and social 
media websites for potential trademark infringement.63  The costs associated with 
paying a third party for trademark watch reports and for Internet monitoring can 
quickly add up when many of these services charge based on the number of marks 
being monitored.  Additionally, such reports must be analyzed by an attorney, so a 
trademark bully would pay high billing rates just to determine if a third party is a 
risk in the first place. 
Additional attorneys fees and other costs are obviously incurred when 
companies proceed beyond C&D letters and seek to stop a potentially infringing 
third party.  One option is to file an opposition to a third party’s trademark 
registration or petition to cancel such registration with the USPTO.  Attorneys 
Marcus Luepke and Brett Heavner with the law firm of Finnegan, Henderson, 
Farabow, Garrett & Dunner LLP, a firm that routinely handles such actions on 
 
 59. BRAND FINANCE, BRAND FINANCE GLOBAL 500, 9 (2012), available at http://www.brand 
finance.com/knowledge_centre/reports/brand-finance-global-500-2012. 
 60. Id. at 10. 
 61. LAW PRACTICE MGMT. COMM., AMERICAN INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE 
ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011 8 (2011), available at http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/books/ 
econsurvey/Pages/default.aspx. 
 62. Michelle Miller, IP:  7 Tips to Policing Trademarks:  The Key to a Cost-Effective and 
Effective Trademark Enforcement Program is Early Detection, INSIDE COUNSEL (Sept. 20, 2011), http:// 
www.insidecounsel.com/2011/09/20/ip-7-tips-to-policing-trademarks?t=ip&page=2.  In publication 
since 1991, InsideCounsel monthly magazine provides advice and insight to general counsel and other 
in-house legal professionals. 
 63. Id. 
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behalf of its clients, explain that “[d]epending on the complexity of the case, the 
motions filed, and the amount of discovery and testimony entered in the case, the 
costs of either oppositions to registration or petitions for cancellation of a 
registration through completion may be up to US $500,000.”64  If the trademark 
bully decides instead to file an infringement suit, the costs could grow even higher.  
According to the American Intellectual Property Law Association’s 2011 Report of 
the Economic Survey, the average cost of a trademark infringement suit ranged 
from $350,000 (when less than $1 million was at risk) to $1.5 million (when more 
than $25 million was at risk).65  While it is true that a trademark bully imposes 
significant costs upon the target of its bullying, the bully clearly faces substantial 
costs of its own. 
C.  THE COSTS OF TRADEMARK BULLYING TO SOCIETY AT LARGE 
Trademark bullying imposes additional costs on society as a whole.  If a 
trademark bully successfully forces a third party to cease use of a trademark that 
would not actually have been declared infringing in a court of law, then that bully 
may have reduced legitimate competition in the marketplace.66  Harming 
competitors, potentially through the use of costly litigation tactics without a real 
belief that infringement has occurred, is sometimes the tactical motivation for 
trademark bullying.  In Professor Gallagher’s interviews of trademark and 
copyright counsel, one interviewee stated, “No, I mean make them stop and make 
them pay for litigation if they don’t.  We can beat them . . . up in court, too.  Makes 
them think twice next time.  Makes them disrupt things to deal with us.”67  As 
discussed above, simply requiring the destruction of inventory and the creation and 
use of a new trademark could be expensive enough to force a small business into 
bankruptcy, which reduces the bully’s potential competition.  Such tactics clearly 
appear anticompetitive but do not rise to the level of an antitrust violation, and they 
are likely to be permitted to continue, largely unchecked, as a business strategy.68 
Numerous scholars have also argued that society can be harmed by bullying’s 
 
 64. B. Brett Heavner & Marcus H.H. Luepke, Avoiding Trademark Pitfalls in the “Land of the 
Unlimited Possibilities”:  The Top 15 Mistakes of Foreign Applicants in the U.S. Trademark Office, 98 
TRADEMARK REP. 974, 990 (2008).  But see LAW PRACTICE MGMT. COMM., supra note 61, at 35 
(determining the average cost of such actions in 2011 to be closer to $90,000). 
 65. LAW PRACTICE MGMT. COMM., supra note 61, at 35. 
 66. Manta, supra note 28, at 854-55 (“Trademark bullying engenders a number of costs for 
society.  First, the market suffers a reduction of legitimate competition.  The potential downsides of this 
effect are well known and include consequences such as higher prices for products and a reduced 
panoply of choices in the marketplace.  Relatedly, bullies create obstacles for consumers’ ability to 
make source-identification connections with products that said consumers may wish to purchase or that 
could benefit them.”). 
 67. Gallagher, supra note 34, at 477. 
 68. Grinvald, supra note 29, at 650–51 (“Free competition among businesses is the bedrock upon 
which American capitalism has been thought to rest, and the government has been devoted to regulating 
anti-competitive behavior since 1890.  However, the majority of trademark bullying will not fall within 
the purview of antitrust law, as a trademark is unlikely to generate market power, which is the main 
requirement for an antitrust cause of action.  Perhaps due to this, there have been only rare instances 
where antitrust claims are brought for trademark misuse.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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impact on free speech and cultural expression:  bullying can stop and potentially 
chill speech that would otherwise be legally permissible.69  In Professor 
Gallagher’s interviews, the interviewee quoted earlier stated that the third parties 
that his clients target are “no threat to us, a different world, very different services.  
No real likelihood of confusion.  But we just didn’t want them to use it, use their 
mark.”70  In such a case, the third party’s use is unlikely to be infringing; such use 
could continue if it were not for the intimidation tactics of the trademark bully.  
This concern about meritless trademark bullying is especially apt when the fair use 
defense is implicated.  When a third party uses a trademark in an expressive 
manner, and thus not as a trademark identifying a source of a good or service, the 
Lanham Act states that such use is not actionable.71  Professor Leah Chan Grinvald, 
for example, has expressed concern about such bullying when it goes to the heart of 
the fair use defense and “targets individuals who are utilizing a trademark to 
parody, criticize, or comment on a trademark owner.”72  Marks are often used for 
parody, such as when the musical group Aqua parodied the “Barbie” doll, or for 
criticism, such as in the case of critical “gripe” or complaint websites like 
www.ballysucks.com.  Both trademark uses in these two examples were permitted 
by the courts as fair use.73  The aggressive and intimidating actions of trademark 
bullies could improperly prevent the artistic or critical commentary that society 
generally views as valuable and that the law permits as fair use.  For these reasons, 
trademark law should not incentivize trademark bullying; instead, it should seek a 
balance between the protection of trademark owners and consumers against the 
costs of bullying and the protection of trademarks from a finding of abandonment. 
II. THE LEGAL REASONS FOR BULLY-LIKE BEHAVIOR 
One might wonder why trademark bullying exists if it is so costly to everyone 
involved.  The reason is that even a strong trademark can lose the protections 
afforded to it by federal trademark law under certain circumstances.74  Trademark 
 
 69. See, e.g., Manta, supra note 29, at 854–55 (“While individuals are supposed to be able to 
make fair use of trademarks, even fair use can at times encounter enforcement efforts by way of C&D 
letters.  One such case was when the Lego Group sought to block use of the websites ‘www.ratemylego. 
com’ and ‘www.ratemylegos.com.’  Some have concluded that ‘[t]rademark law . . . often serves as a 
blunt instrument of cultural intimidation and censorship.’”). 
 70. Gallagher, supra note 34, at 486. 
 71. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006). 
 72. Grinvald, supra note 29, at 652 (“In addition, some trademarks transcend their source-
identifying functions and become cultural property in their own right, even entering our language.  As 
Judge Kozinski has asked, ‘How else do you say that something’s “the Rolls Royce of its class”?  What 
else is a quick fix, but a Band-Aid?’  Actions taken by large corporations against individuals utilizing 
trademarks in this manner harms this mode of cultural expression because threats of litigation through 
cease-and-desist letters are often enough to eradicate the commentary.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 73. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 1998) aff’d, 296 F.3d 
894 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 
1998). 
 74. Third parties can harm a trademark owner’s rights in other ways as well.  Trademark owners 
must monitor the use of their marks by licensees and the quality of the products sold by licensees under 
the mark.  Failing to do so is considered “naked licensing,” which can be grounds for the USPTO or a 
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owners are typically advised to monitor and “police” third party uses of trademarks 
identical to or similar to those of the trademark owner, in order to serve three 
purposes:  preventing genericide, monitoring licensees and quality control and 
stopping any potential infringement.75  Trademark owners do this to avoid a 
determination by a court or by the USPTO that they have “abandoned” their 
trademark.  According to Section 1127 of the Lanham Act, a trademark will be 
deemed “abandoned” when “its use has been discontinued with the intent not to 
resume such use” or when “any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of 
omission as well as commission, causes the mark to become the generic name for 
the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used or otherwise lose its 
significance as a mark.”76  It is primarily this definition of abandonment, and the 
loss of trademark rights that go along with such a determination, that spawned the 
“duty to police” third party trademark usage that is now generally accepted as a 
bedrock principle of trademark law.77  While the duty to police exists, its uncertain 
boundaries have negative consequences.  According to Professor Irina D. Manta, 
“A significant amount of trademark bullying stems from bullies’ impression that to 
maintain a mark, it is the owner’s duty to aggressively police it.  Thus, many 
bullying situations involve mark owners who have taken this perceived duty to 
extreme levels.”78 
A.  THE DUTY TO POLICE ONE’S TRADEMARK TO PREVENT TRADEMARK 
ABANDONMENT 
Breaking down Section 1127 into its component parts, abandonment can be seen 
to occur in three ways:  (1) a trademark owner intends to abandon the mark and 
thus discontinues its use, (2) a trademark owner, through overt acts or omissions, 
allows the mark to become the generic name for the good or service with which it 
has been used or (3) a trademark owner, through overt acts or omissions, allows the 
mark to lose its significance as a mark (such that it no longer identifies the source 
of the good or service to a consumer).  As the duty to police focuses on actions of 
third parties, it does not implicate the “intent to abandon” route to abandonment 
referenced above.79  For the purposes of this article, the focus will be on the duty to 
 
court to declare the mark abandoned.  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:48 (4th ed. 1996). 
 75. Gallagher, supra note 34, at 490 (“The interviewed lawyers often cited a need to ‘police’ their 
clients’ trademarks and copyrights.  They explained that the failure to do so on any particular occasion 
could lead to difficulties in enforcing rights against other targets in the future.”). 
 76. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
 77. MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 31:38. 
 78. Manta, supra note 29, at 866–71 (proposing a system under which trademark owners 
(potential bullies) could submit their cease and desist letters to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for 
review of the merits of the underlying legal claims.  This system could reduce the uncertainty felt by 
trademark owners seeking to protect their marks, and reduce frivolous harassment currently felt by the 
victims of trademark bullying); see also Grinvald, supra note 29, at 630 (“Trademark law and the legal 
system, as both currently operate, work to assist, and perhaps even encourage, the bully’s efforts.”). 
 79. See, e.g., Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. Bankcard Holders of America, 211 U.S.P.Q. 28, 41 (N.D. 
Cal. 1981) (“Member banks may properly use the marks in an authorized manner.  Plaintiff is not aware 
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police resulting from a desire to avoid (1) abandonment through genericide and/or 
(2) abandonment through loss of trademark significance. 
1.  Abandonment Through Genericide 
A trademark can become the generic name for a type of good or service.  This is 
the potential downside of having a popular trademark or a huge market share for a 
particular product or service.  Consumers can fail to recognize that the trademark 
identifies the source of the product.  This process, by which a formerly strong and 
distinct trademark loses its ability to identify the source of a particular product with 
which it has been previously connected, is generally called genericide.80  When 
genericide occurs, the trademark comes to be known by consumers as the generic 
term used to describe the whole category of goods in which that particular product 
exists.81 
One of the classic examples of this process of genericide is the shift of the 
trademark “Aspirin” from the fanciful brand name used by Bayer Co. to market its 
acetyl salicylic acid pain reliever to the generic term used by consumers to refer to 
all such pain relievers whether produced by Bayer Co. or a different 
manufacturer.82  In Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York held that the trademark “Aspirin” had lost its source 
identifying significance; as such, it no longer functioned as a trademark and would 
no longer be afforded the legal rights granted with respect to trademarks.83  In this 
manner, the actions of consumers, third parties unrelated to the manufacture, 
marketing or sale of a branded product, can usurp the trademark rights established 
by a trademark owner.  “Aspirin” now exists in the public domain along with other 
former trademarks like nylon, cellophane, escalator and trampoline.84 
Once a trademark has been declared generic, it must be deemed abandoned by 
the trademark owner according to Section 1127 of the Lanham Act.  This stems 
directly from the fact that a generic trademark can never be granted federal 
trademark registration with the USPTO.85  Former Assistant Attorney General 
William F. Baxter once explained the purpose of trademark protection as follows:  
“[b]y identifying the source of goods or services, marks help consumers to identify 
their expected quality and, hence, assist in identifying goods and services that meet 
the individual consumer’s expectations.”86  From this underlying purpose, it 
 
of any ‘syndicators’ or others who use the logo in an unauthorized manner.  Defendants have not 
demonstrated that plaintiff has abandoned its mark even if there were other infringers; there has been no 
proof of an intent to abandon.”). 
 80. See generally Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789 (2007). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Desai & Rierson, supra note 81. 
 85. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2006); MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 12:56. 
 86. Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1982:  Hearing on S. 2428 Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1982) (statement of William F. Baxter).  S. 2428 was a bill to strengthen the laws 
against counterfeiting of federally registered trademarks. 
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follows that all valid trademarks must function as source identifiers upon which 
consumer good will and confidence can be built.87  Therefore, words that are 
generic, or that become generic, “are unprotectable under the Lanham Act and the 
common law doctrine of unfair competition because they do not (or no longer) have 
the capacity for source identification.”88  A word or phrase is generic where “the 
primary significance of the trademark is to describe the type of product rather than 
the producer.”89  For example, a business that sells cakes cannot claim trademark 
rights in the word “cake.”  The word “cake” is a generic term for the cake product 
being sold; as such, this business cannot obtain monopolistic rights over the generic 
term for a product that will be sold by other businesses.  This is true whether the 
proposed mark starts as a generic term or becomes generic over time, like the mark 
“aspirin.” 
2.  Abandonment for Loss of Significance as a Mark 
Section 1127 of the Lanham Act also indicates that a mark can be abandoned if 
its owner allows it to lose its significance as a mark.90  Distinguishing this situation 
from those instances where failure to stop third party infringers allows a mark to 
become generic, the noted trademark treatise author Thomas McCarthy has posited 
that the important consideration here is not whether such failure to sue constitutes 
abandonment but whether it has resulted in a loss of strength of the underlying 
mark in the eyes of consumers.91  The difference between a mark that has become 
generic and one that has lost its significance as a mark is one of scale.  If a mark 
has lost its significance as a mark, it can no longer clearly signify to a consumer the 
source of that particular good or service.  It has not become the generic label for the 
product or service being sold, but the direct link between product or service and its 
source has been severed.  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
explained trademark significance as follows: 
Without question, distinctiveness can be lost by failing to take action against 
infringers.  If there are numerous products in the marketplace bearing the alleged 
mark, purchasers may learn to ignore the “mark” as a source identification.  When that 
occurs, the conduct of the former owner, by failing to police its mark, can be said to 
have caused the mark to lose its significance as a mark.92 
The loss of significance grounds for abandonment is often confused with the 
defenses of acquiescence and laches.  In his treatise, McCarthy distinguishes 
 
 87. MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 3:1. 
 88. Desai & Rierson, supra note 81, at 1809; MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 12:56; see also 15 
U.S.C. § 1064 (2005) (“A petition to cancel a registration of a mark . . . may . . . be filed . . . if the 
registered mark becomes the generic name for the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which it is 
registered . . . .”). 
 89. Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’g, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
 90. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
 91. MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 17:8. 
 92. Wallpaper Mfrs., Ltd. v. Crown Wallcovering Corp., 680 F.2d 755, 766 (Fed. Cir. 1982). 
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between acquiescence and abandonment as follows: 
While plaintiff’s failure to prosecute trademark uses by parties other than defendants 
may be evidence of plaintiff’s acquiescence in defendant’s use, such a failure is not 
acquiescence where a third party’s usage is de minimus.  Acquiescence should not be 
confused with abandonment of trademark rights.  The defense of abandonment results 
in a loss of rights as against the world, while the defense of acquiescence merely 
results in a loss of rights as against one defendant.93 
Acquiescence can therefore be seen as a personal defense.  If a trademark owner 
knows of a specific third party’s potential trademark infringement and fails to take 
steps to stop it for a significant period of time, that third party may be able to use 
the defense of acquiescence to prohibit the trademark owner from stopping the third 
party’s use in the future.94  This is very similar to the equitable defense of laches 
that such a third party may also be able to use.  For laches to apply, the third party 
would need to show that the trademark owner’s unreasonable delay in bringing the 
trademark suit would cause unfair prejudice to the third party.95  In both instances, 
these defenses are distinct from abandonment because they only hinder the 
trademark owner’s monopolistic trademark rights against the single third party.96  
Abandonment terminates those rights against the whole world.97 
The defendant in Wallpaper Mfrs., Ltd. v. Crown Wallcovering Corp. raised the 
defense of abandonment.98  Both the plaintiff and the defendant had been using the 
trademark “Crown” in connection with the sale of wallpaper products.99  The 
plaintiff was the first user of this mark, and thus had priority absent loss of the 
trademark rights due to abandonment.100  The United States Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals quickly dismissed the argument that abandonment had occurred 
through the plaintiff trademark owner’s intent to abandon.101  Additionally, the 
trademark “Crown” had not become a generic term within the field of wallpaper.102  
The lower court had found abandonment based on the evidence presented that the 
trademark “Crown” no longer identifies either party’s goods or distinguishes them 
from those manufactured or sold by the other; therefore, the court ordered that the 
plaintiff’s trademark registration be canceled because the mark could no longer 
serve as a source identifier and customers would be confused by two companies 
using the same mark in the same industry.103 
 
 93. National Football League v. Governor of the State of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1390 (D. Del. 
1977) (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 31:14) (noting that the quote is not present in the current 
edition of this treatise). 
 94. MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 31:42. 
 95. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946); see also BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 953 (9th ed. 2009); MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 31:12. 
 96. MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 31:43 (4th ed.). 
 97. See, e.g., National Football League, 435 F. Supp. at 1390. 
 98. Wallpaper Mfrs., Ltd. v. Crown Wallcovering Corp., 680 F.2d 755 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 99. Id. at 757-58. 
 100. Id. at 757-58. 
 101. Id. at 759. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 760. 
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However, this decision was reversed by the United States Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals, which stated: 
The only issue before us is abandonment—whether appellant has forfeited all rights 
because the mark CROWN no longer identifies appellant as a source for wallpaper.  
The board’s finding that CROWN continues to function as a mark for appellant can 
only mean appellant’s acts have not been of such character as to cause the mark to 
lose its significance as an indication of origin for appellant’s goods.104 
The fact that some consumers also knew of the connection between the defendant 
and the mark did counter the evidence that many consumers still saw the mark as 
an indicator that the plaintiff was the source of the product.105 
While the plaintiff in Wallpaper Mfrs. could have a claim against the defendant 
for infringement, the defendant’s concurrent use of the mark was not substantial 
enough to cause abandonment.  For abandonment to occur due to loss of 
significance of a mark, that loss must be something more than simply confusion 
among a small number of consumers due to two competitors using a similar mark. 
B.  OVERESTIMATION OF DUTY TO POLICE BY TRADEMARK OWNERS 
While trademark owners routinely cite the duty to police as justification for their 
bully-like behavior,106 the actual risk of losing one’s trademark rights due to a 
failure to police third party trademark use appears to be highly exaggerated.  In the 
majority of cases in which a failure to police third party trademark usage is alleged, 
courts find that any such failure has not risen to the level of abandonment of the 
mark and thus is inconsequential.107  Where the courts have terminated a mark in 
such cases, the deciding factor is not whether the mark owner failed to police third 
party use but whether the owner evidenced an intent to abandon the mark or 
allowed the mark to become so freely used by competitors that it no longer 
functions as an indicator of source at all.108  Additionally, a “party seeking to prove 
abandonment has a high burden of proof,” and that burden is rarely met.109 
In a clear case where termination of trademark rights was appropriate, the 
Second Circuit held that the “Milk of Magnesia” trademark, registered with the 
 
 104. Id. at 767. 
 105. Id. at 767. 
 106. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 34, at 490 (“The interviewed lawyers often cited a need to 
‘police’ their clients’ trademarks and copyrights.  They explained that the failure to do so on any 
particular occasion could lead to difficulties in enforcing rights against other targets in the future.”). 
 107. See, e.g., Wallpaper Mfrs., 680 F.2d 755. 
 108. See, e.g., Acme Valve & Fittings Co. v. Wayne, 386 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (intent to 
abandon found due to discontinuance of manufacture, selling off of all inventory and the failure to 
renew the trademark registration); Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19 (1900) 
(confirming the Second Circuit’s holding that the plaintiff could no longer enforce her rights in the mark 
“Hunyadi” for bottled water because the mark had become generic in the eyes of consumers). 
 109. STX, Inc. v. Bauer USA, Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1492 (N.D. Cal. 1997); see also Citibank, N.A. 
v. City Bank of San Francisco, 206 U.S.P.Q. 997 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (“Abandonment places a strict 
burden of proof upon the party seeking to prove abandonment.  The party seeking to prove abandonment 
must prove an intent to abandon on the part of the trademark owner.”). 
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United States Patent and Trademark Office in 1905, should be canceled.110  The 
Second Circuit based its decision on two separate grounds for cancelation:  the fact 
that (1) the mark “was not in the actual and exclusive use of the defendant, or its 
predecessors, during the ten years prescribed by the statute,”111 and (2) the 
defendant’s abandonment of the mark as shown by its failure “during a long period 
to assert or enforce its rights” against widespread use of the mark by 
competitors.112  Between the date of registration of the mark in 1905 and the start 
of the cancelation proceeding on June 25, 1924, the defendant trademark owner in 
this case had allowed numerous competitors to sell high quantities of the same 
basic product under the “Milk of Magnesia” mark.113  The Second Circuit 
determined that the defendant “had taken no steps whatever to assert its rights, and 
had really ignored the extensive use by others.”114  Such blatant disregard for the 
trademark allowed it to become abandoned, because the mark “no longer 
indicat[ed] the origin of the goods sold under it.”115 
In contrast, in Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc. v. Better Business 
Bureau, Inc., the plaintiff organization brought an action for infringement against a 
former member who countered by asserting that the plaintiff’s mark had been 
abandoned.116  This defense was premised on the fact that the plaintiff had failed to 
stop numerous smaller and local organizations from referring to themselves as 
“Better Business Divisions, Councils and Departments, etc. of various Chambers of 
Commerce.”117  However, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida determined, based on evidence presented by the plaintiff, that the existence 
of such third party organizations had not “affected the distinctiveness” of the 
plaintiff’s mark.118  As a result, the defendant’s abandonment defense failed.119 
Similarly, in STX, Inc. v. Bauer USA, Inc., the defendant Bauer, a former 
licensee of the trademark for protective skating equipment at issue, alleged that 
STX’s trademark rights had been abandoned and thus could no longer be 
enforced.120  This defense was based on an STX executive’s admission that the 
company was aware of several competitors making widespread use of similar, 
 
 110. McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles H. Phillips Chemical Co., 53 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1931), 
modified, 53 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 552 (1932). 
 111. McKesson, 53 F.2d at 345. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 344-45.  In particular, the court made reference to six direct competitors—American 
Druggists’ Syndicate, E.R. Squibb & Sons, H.K. Mulford Company, Nelson Baker Company, Frederick 
Stearns & Company, and Park, Davis & Co.—that all began selling the product under the “Milk of 
Magnesia” mark in early 1900s and substantially increased their sales by 1924.  Id. 
 114. Id. at 345. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Council of Better Bus. Bureaus, Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau, Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. 282 (S.D. Fla. 
1978). 
 117. Id. at 31. 
 118. Id.  Additionally, the court also noted that the defendant’s own evidence offered dramatic 
proof of the distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s mark.  Id. 
 119. Council of Better Bus. Bureaus, Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. at 282. 
 120. STX, Inc. v. Bauer USA, Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1492, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16250, *29 (N.D. 
Cal. 1997). 
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unlicensed and potentially infringing trademarks.121  While STX had knowledge of 
such third party trademark usage, STX had taken no formal action against any of 
these third parties in the five years preceding this suit against Bauer.122  The U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of California first clarified that “evidence of 
other potential infringers is ‘irrelevant’ to a suit against a particular infringer” 
absent convincing evidence of abandonment of the mark.123  The court then noted 
that the defendant had only shown that STX was aware of third party uses; the 
defendant had not presented any evidence illustrating STX’s consent, tacit or 
implied, to such potentially infringing uses.124  Quoting an opinion by the Ninth 
Circuit, the Court stated that “an owner is not required to act immediately against 
every possible infringing use to avoid a holding of abandonment.”125  Despite 
STX’s business determination not to take formal action against the potential 
infringers of which it was aware, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on 
the issue of abandonment was dismissed because STX’s monitoring of industry 
magazines and visits to retail establishments led the court to conclude that STX 
conducted enough “policing” to prevent an unambiguous determination of 
abandonment.126 
Based on abandonment case precedent, what should a trademark owner do to 
protect its mark from an allegation of abandonment?  The court in Wallpaper Mfrs. 
explained that: 
[A]n owner is not required to act immediately against every possibly infringing use to 
avoid a holding of abandonment . . . .  Some infringements are short-lived and will 
disappear without action by the trademark owner.  In the case of a mark temporarily 
not in use or only used to a limited extent, a company may be hard pressed to extend 
its financial resources to fight an infringer when it has little or no current market 
under its mark.127 
Clearly, courts do not require a trademark owner to stop every potential third party 
infringer.  Additionally, the cases suggest that absent evidence of intent to abandon, 
a trademark owner simply needs to prevent its mark from becoming generic and 
monitor the significance of its mark within the relevant consuming public.  Both of 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at *38. 
 123. Id.; see also United States Jaycees v. San Francisco Junior Chamber of Commerce, 354 F. 
Supp. 61, 73 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff’d, 513 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1975) (“Numerous cases have rejected this 
defense, holding that the existence of infringers other than the defendant was irrelevant to a 
determination of whether the defendant should be enjoined from continuing in its infringement of 
plaintiffs’ trademarks and in its unfair competition.”); Citibank, N.A. v. City Bank of San Francisco, 206 
U.S.P.Q. 997 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (“The existence of others engaged in the same acts of trademark 
infringement and unfair competition is irrelevant and is no defense against the trademark proprietor’s 
suit against a particular infringer.”); Visa Int’l Service Ass’n v. Bankcard Holders of America, 211 
U.S.P.Q. 28 (N.D. Cal. 1981). 
 124. STX, Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1492, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16250 at *39. 
 125. Id. at *40  (quoting Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1018 n.1 
(9th Cir. 1985)). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Wallpaper Mfrs., Ltd. v. Crown Wallcovering Corp., 680 F.2d 755 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
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these goals could be achieved by employing a proactive branding strategy rather 
than a reactive litigation strategy.  Perhaps a trademark owner would be wiser to 
spend money on advertising rather than spending it on bully-like tactics against 
non-competitor third parties.  With this in mind, were the actions taken by Chick-
fil-A and Starbucks reasonable or necessary?  The “Starbucks” mark is clearly not 
generic, and it is highly unlikely that the “Charbucks” mark could cause the 
“Starbucks” mark to lose its significance as a trademark given the large amount of 
advertising conducted by Starbucks and the widespread brand recognition it enjoys.  
However, the fact that “Charbucks” was being used by a coffee company could 
have made this a closer case for loss of significance, or a laches or acquiescence 
concern, to the Starbucks attorney that sent the first C&D letter to Jim Clark.128  
However, the attorneys for Chick-fil-A have less merit to their concerns.  The 
company’s “Eat Mor Chikin” mark is relatively popular and well known in its retail 
markets, suggesting that it is unlikely to be generic or close to losing its 
significance as a trademark.  Whether it is known in areas without access to a retail 
location is arguable; Muller-Moore certainly claims to live in such a market and 
never to have heard of the mark prior to the dispute.  Additionally, Muller-Moore’s 
“Eat More Kale” mark is unlikely to hinder the strength of the Chick-fil-A marks 
because Muller-Moore is not a competitor of Chick-fil-A and has only negligible 
sales. 
III.  COGNITIVE BIAS RESULTS IN OVERESTIMATION OF RISK OF 
TRADEMARK ABANDONMENT 
Why do trademark bullies expend so much time and energy pursuing 
noncompetitor third parties?  As discussed above, case law suggests that the duty to 
police is not overly burdensome and simply requires mark owners to use their mark 
in such a way as to keep it from becoming generic and to police uses by 
competitors so that the mark maintains its ability to identify the source of a product 
or service.  Based on this premise, it appears that the actions of trademark bullies—
investing thousands of dollars in policing third party uses, pursuing weak claims to 
court when the bullied party refuses to capitulate, and incurring extensive bad 
publicity in the process—may not be entirely rational.129  Such seemingly irrational 
behavior consistently chosen by trademark owners suggests that other 
 
 128. For a discussion of this issue of whether lawyers exacerbate the problem of trademark 
bullying, or if they are required by ethical duties to stop bullying regarding meritless claims, see Jason 
Vogel and Jeremy A. Schachter, supra note 46, at 503 and Gallagher, supra note 33, at 490 (“In these 
four interviews, the lawyers each made some statement about how they would ‘fire’ a client who asked 
them to enforce an IP claim where the lawyer believed the claim was without merit.  When probed as to 
whether they had ever had a client who asked them to enforce a claim the lawyer had explained was 
weak or non-meritorious, these lawyers stated that they had.  When asked about the specific instances, 
all four lawyers indicated that they followed the clients’ instructions to enforce the claims.  None of 
these lawyers could identify an instance where they had actually ‘fired’ a client under such 
circumstances.”). 
 129. This assessment was also made by William T. Gallagher based on his empirical interviews 
with trademark and copyright attorneys.  Gallagher, supra note 34, at 479-80 (“The research interviews 
revealed, in a number of ways, that the decision to assert IP claims is not entirely a rational decision.”). 
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psychological factors may be at play. 
Research from the fields of psychology and economics identifying cognitive 
biases and heuristics can resolve this apparent disconnect.  Numerous behavioral 
studies have shown that humans are not always rational actors when faced with 
decisions pertaining to risk and uncertainty.130  Instead, such studies show that 
people often rely on mental shortcuts called cognitive biases or heuristics to 
consciously or subconsciously assist in making these sorts of decisions.131  Legal 
scholars have already applied these theories of cognitive bias and heuristics in legal 
decision making to explain the sometimes irrational behavior of judges,132 juries 
(especially in terms of damage awards in tort litigation),133 and even negotiating 
parties.134  This Article proposes that cognitive biases can also help to explain the 
actions of trademark bullies.  Better understanding the motivations, both legal and 
psychological, of trademark bullies will assist courts and legislators in crafting 
solutions to deter trademark bullying and to address the various problematic 
consequences of bullying discussed above. 
A.  BACKGROUND ON COGNITIVE BIAS AND PROSPECT THEORY 
Starting in the 1970s, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman published a number 
of empirical studies that formed the foundation for the study of decision making 
under conditions of uncertainty.135  In 1974’s “Judgment Under Uncertainty:  
Heuristics and Biases,” they determined that “people rely on a limited number of 
heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and 
predicting values to simpler judgmental operations.”136  These heuristics are the 
conscious or unconscious mental shortcuts that allow a person to quickly make a 
decision evaluating the likelihood of an uncertain outcome, such as the likelihood a 
 
 130. See CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000) 
(containing a sample of the definitive articles on this topic); see also Colin F. Camerer, Prospect Theory 
in the Wild:  Evidence from the Field, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 288 (Daniel Kahneman & 
Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (summarizing several empirical studies supporting this approach). 
 131. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:  Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCI. 4157, 1124 (1974) [hereinafter Judgment Under Uncertainty]. 
 132. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001). 
 133. See, e.g., John H. Montgomery, Cognitive Biases and Heuristics in Tort Litigation:  A 
Proposal to Limit Their Effects Without Changing the World, 85 NEB. L. REV. 15 (2006); Edward J. 
McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury:  Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 Va. L. 
Rev. 1341 (1995). 
 134. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement:  
An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107 (1994) [hereinafter Psychological Barriers]; Russell 
Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement:  A New Look at the Role of the 
Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77 (1997) [hereinafter Psychology, Economics, and Settlement]; Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996). 
 135. See, e.g., Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 132; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Prospect Theory:  An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) [hereinafter 
Prospect Theory]; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Psychology of Preferences, 246 SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN 160 (1982); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and 
the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251 (1986). 
 136. Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 132, at 1124. 
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small business will capitulate after receiving a C&D letter, or the likelihood that the 
failure to police every third party use of one’s trademark will result in abandonment 
of the mark.137  While Tversky and Kahneman acknowledge that heuristics can be 
useful, their work illustrates how various heuristics can lead to “severe and 
systematic errors.”138 
These empirical studies on cognitive bias appear to argue against the rational 
choice theory of behavior that has long been a dominant approach in legal theory.  
Rational choice theory “presumes that individuals always try to maximize their 
expected utility, primarily through acting rationally when making decisions 
involving risks and benefits.”139  Contrary to this view, the empirical studies on 
cognitive bias suggest that people sometimes rely on quick heuristical judgments 
rather than weighing risks and benefits to reflect the probability of the various 
outcomes.  This reliance on shortcuts is a byproduct of human cognitive 
limitations, including the inability to process large amounts of information at one 
time.  Kahneman explains that “when faced with a difficult question, we often 
answer an easier one instead, usually without noticing the substitution.”140  While 
analyses of law and legal disputes based on rational choice theory have made 
substantial contributions to legal scholarship,141 numerous legal scholars are now 
questioning that approach and attempting to incorporate legal realism into the 
dialogue using the research on cognitive bias and the related insights from prospect 
theory.142 
Since Kahneman and Tversky’s original article, numerous cognitive biases, 
heuristics and related effects have been documented and applied.143  Kahneman and 
Tversky built upon their initial discoveries in this area to develop a theory of 
decision making under conditions of uncertainty, which they termed “prospect 
theory.”  As trademark bullying is based on evaluation of risk and uncertainty 
pertaining to trademarks, this article will apply prospect theory to the problem of 
trademark bullying, with particular emphasis on the impact of the certainty effect, 
endowment effect and sunk cost effect on this prospect theory analysis. 
 
 137. See Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 755 (2003) (book 
review). 
 138. Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 132 at 1124. 
 139. Montgomery, supra note 134, at 20; see also Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded:  Economics 
in the Future of the Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 433 (1997); GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH 
TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976) (characterizing the assumption that in decision making people 
“maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of 
information”). 
 140. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 12 (2011). 
 141. See generally Richard A. Posner, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990); Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 
(1973); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1 (1984). 
 142. See e.g., Montgomery, supra note 134, at 20; McCaffery et al., supra note 134; Psychological 
Barriers, supra note 135; Psychology, Economics, and Settlement, supra note 135; Rachlinski, supra 
note 135; Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115 (2003) 
[hereinafter Risk Preference]. 
 143. See Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 132. 
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B.  PROSPECT THEORY:  FRAMING RISK JUDGMENTS AS GAINS VERSUS LOSSES 
While rational choice theory states that people make rational decisions to 
maximize the value of their total wealth, prospect theory argues that attempts to 
maximize wealth are influenced by systematic biases in judgment, such as the 
framing effect.144  The framing effect refers to the observation that people treat 
logically equivalent judgments differently if they are framed as losses or as 
gains.145  As an example of the framing effect, imagine a cancer patient trying to 
decide whether to undergo an effective yet risky surgery.  A surgery reported to 
have an 80% survival rate will be chosen more often than the same surgery reported 
to have a 20% mortality rate—even though these statements of risk are equivalent.  
Framed as a gain (survival), the surgical option is appealing; framed as a loss 
(mortality), the same option is aversive.  This example demonstrates that logically 
equivalent judgments about risk are treated quite differently depending on the way 
they are framed; these framing effects on medical decision making have been 
observed in patients as well as medical professionals, such as radiologists.146 
A principal feature of prospect theory, which is concerned with how people 
actually make decisions regarding uncertainty and risk, is its attention to the way 
decisions are framed as either gains or losses.  In accordance with empirical 
studies, prospect theory predicts that “people generally make risk averse decisions 
when choosing between options that appear to be gains and risk seeking decisions 
when choosing between options that appear to be losses.”147  This suggests that 
people will make riskier decisions in order to try to avoid loss, which has been 
described as “loss aversion.”148 
Kahneman and Tversky have argued that there are several psychological 
mechanisms that interact in order to produce the loss aversion shown in empirical 
studies.  First, when making decisions, people judge their options relative to a 
frame or reference point.149  Generally, this reference point is the status quo or the 
person’s current position or status.  Professor Chris Guthrie, an expert on 
behavioral law and economics, offers a helpful example:  “People will generally 
choose a definite $1,000 prize over a 50% chance at receiving a $2,000 prize but 
will opt to face a 50% chance at having to pay a $2,000 fine over having to pay a 
 
 144. Prospect Theory, supra note 136. 
 145. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AMERICAN 
PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984). 
 146. See Barbara J. McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies, 306 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259 (1982); see also John M. Rybash & Paul A. Roodin, The Framing Heuristic 
Influences Judgments About Younger and Older Adults’ Decision to Refuse Medical Treatment, 3 
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 171 (1989); Dawn K. Wilson et al., Framing of Decisions and Selection 
of Alternatives in Health Care, 2 SOC. BEHAV. 51 (1987). 
 147. Risk Preference, supra note 143, at 1116.  
 148. See e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies:  The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and 
Status Quo Bias, 5 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 1, Winter 1991, 193 [hereinafter Anomalies]; Peter 
McGraw et al., Comparing Gains and Losses, 21 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. 1438 (2010). 
 149. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 141, at 282 (“Outcomes that are better than the reference points 
are gains.  Below the reference point they are losses.”). 
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definite $1,000 fine.”150  If the individual was acting rationally, as predicted by 
rational choice theory, people should be found to have no preference between the 
$1,000 prize and the 50% chance at a $2,000 prize (as the expected benefit is 
effectively the same).  However, experiments in support of prospect theory show 
that an individual faced with such a decision frames the decision as a gain or a loss 
relative to the status quo.  When compared to the status quo reference point, either 
prize is seen as a gain and either fine is a loss.  Prospect theory argues, and studies 
demonstrate, that individuals faced with this problem tend to be risk averse 
regarding the gains and will select the guaranteed $1000 prize. 151  However, they 
will be risk seeking when faced with a decision about accepting a loss and will 
typically opt for the 50% chance at avoiding the larger fine.152  Scholars in a variety 
of fields have noted the important repercussions this rule has on decisions such as 
those regarding financial investments or even criminal plea bargaining.153 
How can the theory account for this preference to be risk averse with potential 
gains and risk seeking when judging potential losses?  A fundamental feature of 
prospect theory is the premise that losses are more cognitively salient than gains.  
According to Kahneman, “When directly compared or weighted against each other, 
losses loom larger than gains. This asymmetry between the power of positive and 
negative expectations or experiences has an evolutionary history.  Organisms that 
treat threats as more urgent than opportunities have a better chance to survive and 
reproduce.”154  Empirical studies have suggested that people are so much more 
sensitive to losses than they are to gains that they perceive a loss to be nearly two 
times more emotionally charged than a numerically equivalent gain.155  
Before applying the lessons of prospect theory to trademark bullying, it is useful 
to see how prospect theory has already been applied to the logic of litigation.  
Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski has examined how prospect theory’s loss aversion 
may impact whether litigants decide to pursue a trial rather than seek a settlement 
of their dispute.  According to Rachlinski, plaintiffs in a dispute are effectively 
faced with two potential “gains”:  a settlement agreement that would improve upon 
the status quo, which would be seen as the current situation where the defendant is 
 
 150. Risk Preference, supra note 143, at 1118. 
 151. See, e.g., Risk Preference, supra note 143; Rachlinski, supra note 135; Psychological 
Barriers, supra note 135. 
 152. Studies have shown that these risk preferences are reversed when faced with very low 
probability gains and losses.  Thus, an individual faced with a $50 parking ticket (a clear loss) is now 
likely to be risk averse and pay that fine rather than challenge the ticket and risk a 5% chance that the 
fine would be increased to $1000 (despite the large 95% chance that the fine could be eliminated 
entirely).  See, e.g., Guthrie, Risk Preference, supra note 143, at 1118; Rachlinski, supra note 135; Chris 
Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation:  A Psychological Theory, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 163 (2000). 
 153. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 138, at 755; Ian Weinstein, Don’t Believe Everything You 
Think:  Cognitive Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 9 Clinical L. Rev. 783, 784 (2003). 
 154.  KAHNEMAN, supra note 141, at 282. 
 155.  Id. at 284 (“The ‘loss aversion ratio’ has been estimated as typically ranging from 1.5 to 
2.5.”); Risk Preference, supra note 143, at 1119 (“In fact, the available empirical evidence suggests that 
losses generally loom at least twice as large as equivalent gains.  Thus, a prospective $1,000 loss will 
have much greater effect on a decision maker than a prospective $1,000 gain.”); Anomalies, supra note 
149. 
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allegedly causing injury to the plaintiff, or a trial whereby the plaintiff has the 
chance to seek an even more favorable judgment against the defendant.156  In 
contrast, the defendant can be viewed as facing two possible losses:  a definite loss 
under the plaintiff’s proposed settlement agreement terms or an uncertain risk at 
trial that the damages awarded would be less than those under the settlement 
agreement.157  When faced with two gains, prospect theory posits that the plaintiff 
will prefer the settlement agreement—the risk averse option.158  The defendant, on 
the other hand, will be averse to any loss and will thus prefer the risk seeking 
option of going to trial.159  These predictions also hold true in settlement 
negotiations depending on whether each party characterizes the settlement as a gain 
or as a loss.160  Rachlinski conducted two empirical studies involving subjects 
asked to respond to litigation scenarios and also studied the settlements obtained in 
actual disputes.161  In all, he found the framing predictions of prospect theory to 
hold true based on whether the suit or settlement was viewed as a loss or gain.162 
In another study concerned with framing in the litigation context, C. Russell 
Korobkin and Chris Guthrie had undergraduate students respond to proposed 
settlement amounts for hypothetical litigation scenarios from the perspective of the 
plaintiff.163  Two versions of the settlement offer were crafted, one framing the 
settlement as a gain to the plaintiff and the other framing the settlement as a loss to 
the plaintiff.  Students found settlement offers framed as gains as attractive, while 
offers framed as a loss were less attractive, meaning that  the decision to accept the 
risk of going to trial was influenced by the framing effect.164  This conclusion was 
also confirmed by Babcock et al. in an empirical study asking undergraduates and 
trial attorneys to take the perspective of either plaintiff or defendant in a 
 
 156. See Rachlinski, supra  note 135, at 118-9. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. 
 159. Id. at 118-19.  Faming theory does not, however, accurately predict the outcomes of frivolous 
disputes:  
Although the framing theory holds true in most cases, it appears not to hold true in situations 
involving frivolous litigation.  In frivolous or low-probability litigation, the plaintiff typically 
chooses between a relatively small settlement amount and a low likelihood of obtaining a much 
larger amount at trial.  Defendants, by contrast, typically must choose either to pay some small 
settlement or face a low likelihood of having to pay a much larger amount at trial.  In short, 
plaintiffs in frivolous suits typically confront decision options that appear to be low-probability 
gains, while defendants choose between options that appear to be low-probability losses.  
Decision makers confronted with low-probability gains, like plaintiffs in frivolous suits, tend to 
make risk-seeking decisions, while those confronted with low-probability losses, like defendants 
in frivolous suits, tend to make risk averse decisions.  In short, litigant risk preferences are likely 
to be reversed in frivolous suits, with plaintiffs relatively more attracted to trial than are 
defendants. 
Risk Preference, supra note 143, at 1124. 
 160. Id. at 119. 
 161. Id. at 119-20. 
 162. Id. at 118-20. 
 163. Psychological Barriers, supra note 135, at 129-38. 
 164. Id. at 132-33. 
37.2 KISER ARTICLE FINAL (BL) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2014  9:17 PM 
238 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [37:2 
hypothetical products liability suit.165  Subjects were told that the defendant had 
been found liable and the upcoming litigation was only to determine the amount of 
damages.  Subjects were then asked to set a “reservation price” they would accept 
to avoid the upcoming trial.  For plaintiffs, the reservation price was the minimum 
amount they would accept to not continue litigation; for the defendants, the 
reservation price represented the maximum price they were willing to offer for 
settlement.166  Because the subjects were given information on the average of 
awards handed down in cases similar to theirs, the authors were able to categorize 
the reservation prices as risk averse or risk seeking.  For plaintiffs, setting a 
reservation price below the average was characterized as risk averse, while a price 
above the average (and thus less likely to succeed) was characterized as risk 
seeking.  Conversely, for defendants, setting a reservation price below the average 
was risk seeking, while a reservation price above the average was risk averse.167  
Conforming to the predictions of the framing hypothesis, the authors found that 
plaintiffs accepted lower than average, i.e. risk averse, reservation prices, whereas 
defendants trended toward risk seeking offers (although this trend did not reach 
statistical significance).168 
Parties in a trademark bullying scenario are less easily characterized than the 
traditional litigants that inspired the empirical studies discussed above.  A 
trademark bullying dispute is most consistent with the results from Korobkin and 
Guthrie in framing changes affected the attractiveness of settlement offers.  To 
illustrate this, consider the positions of the litigants in the Charbucks dispute:   
First, consistent with Rachlinski’s analysis, Jim Clark likely viewed his options as 
as a decision between two losses.  Any settlement agreement with Starbucks would 
likely involve limits on the manner in which he could use his mark and, based on 
the initial negotiations, might require the destruction of his inventory and the loss 
of the goodwill he had established in that mark among consumers.  Furthermore, at 
trial Clark faced direct losses related to the investment of time and resources in 
defending the suit, but he has the potential to emerge with a judgment in his favor 
and the ability to continue using the mark unencumbered.  Prospect theory suggests 
that Jim Clark would choose the risk seeking path and elect to go to trial on the 
chance, however small, that his losses could be largely avoided.  In fact, this is 
precisely what he did.  Clark abandoned negotiation talks when Starbucks refused 
to pay all of his costs he had incurred.169 
Applying prospect theory to the motivations of the plaintiff trademark bully is a 
more complex calculation.  Where the bullied party gives into the trademark bully’s 
demands, prospect theory suggests that, in agreement with the findings of 
Korobkin, Guthrie and Babcock, bullies will be risk averse by pushing for the 
 
 165. C. Linda Babcock, Henry S. Farber, Cynthia Fobian & Eldar Shafir, Forming Beliefs about 
Adjudicated Outcomes:  Perceptions of Risk and Reservation Values, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON 289 
(1995). 
 166.  Id. at 292. 
 167.  Id. at 295. 
 168.  Id. at 295-97. 
 169. History of Events—Starbucks Litigation, supra note 6.. 
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definite gain afforded by a settlement.  To some extent, bullies do choose this 
option, which explains the prevalence of C&D letters.  However, trademark law 
imposes limitations on what bullies feel are acceptable settlement terms, as they 
they must also protect against genericide and abandonment.  As a result, bullies 
will appear more aggressive in settlement negotiations by offering paltry 
concessions to the bullied party, which in turn makes settlement less likely to 
occur, particularly in the case of a risk seeking defendant.  Indeed, in the 
“Charbucks” dispute Starbucks made strong demands, including the destruction of 
inventory and cessation of use of the “Charbucks” mark, while refusing to pay all 
of Clark’s related costs in exchange. 
Furthermore, although litigation is certainly a riskier option, it has the added 
benefit to the bully of making a public display of an active attempt to police a 
mark, even if the bully ultimately loses in court.  In this sense, litigation can be 
seen as a gain.  A trademark bully essentially faces three choices:  (1) a gain 
through a favorable settlement agreement; (2) a gain (protection against genericide 
and abandonment) through litigation, successful or not; or (3) a chance of loss of 
trademark rights if settlement or litigation is not pursued and a court later deems 
policing efforts to be insufficient as a result.  Given prospect theory’s principal 
finding that decision makers are subject to strong loss aversion effects, it is 
unsurprising that the first and second options are preferred over the third.  To avoid 
loss, the bully will accept either a settlement or protection gain.  Thus, Starbucks 
continues to appeal the adverse decisions in the “Charbucks” litigation despite the 
spiraling costs of attorneys’ fees and related expenses like consumer surveys.  The 
aggressive tactics of trademark bullies—one-sided settlement agreements, threats 
of litigation and considerable investment in litigation—can be seen as a byproduct 
of decision making from a gain versus loss frame.  Trademark law establishes the 
frame; bullies simply play by the rules. 
Loss aversion in the context of a loss-versus-gain frame is the principal feature 
prospect theory that explains trademark bullying behavior.  However, the problem 
is exacerbated by three related biases also described by prospect theory:  the 
certainty effect, the endowment effect and the sunk cost effect. 
1.  The Certainty Effect 
The certainty effect was interpreted in light of cognitive biases by Kahneman 
and Tversky in their seminal paper on prospect theory in 1979.170  They defined 
this phenomenon as the tendency of people to overvalue “outcomes that are 
considered certain, relative to outcomes which are merely probable.”171  To 
illustrate the certainty effect, Kahneman, in his book Thinking, Fast and Slow, uses 
the following example:172  You are given a $1 million inheritance, but the 
inheritance is challenged in court.  On the day that the court is to render its verdict, 
your attorney explains that you have a 95% chance of winning the case and keeping 
 
 170. See Prospect Theory, supra note 136. 
 171. See id. at 265. 
 172. KAHNEMAN, supra note 141, at 311-312. 
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the entire $1 million sum.  If approached by a risk adjustment company with an 
offer for a certain sum of $910,000, however, you are likely to consider this a 
viable option.  Even though the offer from the risk adjustment company is $40,000 
less than the expected value of waiting for a verdict in the case, you are likely to 
place a high value the certainty of knowing your fate now.  This overvaluation of 
certainty is actually the basis for the risk adjustment and structured settlement 
industry.  That industry profits from the certainty effect—the fact that people will 
forgo even a relatively high probability of a larger sum of money for a definite, or 
certain, payment of smaller sum.  In short, people overvalue certainty. 
This concept was also demonstrated in the study by Babcock et al. discussed 
above, where subjects representing plaintiffs accepted risk averse settlement 
amounts less than the average award value of similar cases.173  Subjects who were 
induced to see the litigation as more risky (by seeing a wider variation in the award 
values for individual cases) were willing to accept even lower settlement amounts, 
demonstrating that as perceived risk increases, people are willing to pay more for a 
certain gain.174 
The certainty effect also applies to losses.  If faced with a small risk of loss, 
people have been shown to be “willing to pay far more than the expected value to 
eliminate them altogether.”175  They are willing to pay to remove the uncertainty, 
or, phrased another way, they overvalue certainty and are willing to pay for it.  This 
principle is especially relevant to the discussion of trademark bullying.  Even if an 
attorney tells her client that failure to stop all remotely infringing or diluting 
trademark use rarely results in the abandonment of a trademark, that attorney is 
unlikely to offer a promise of certainty that the trademark is safe.  Thus, the client 
is faced with a low probability of risk that a third party somewhere in the 
marketplace, selling a potentially unrelated product with a remotely similar 
trademark, could harm the client’s own trademark rights.  A completely rational 
client would determine that such a risk minimal, and only invest a small sum of 
money into monitoring the third party usage or countering any concerning usage 
with increased advertising presence.  But the certainty effect may cause the client to 
overvalue certainty, and push for reducing risk of harm to the trademark to zero.176  
Such a client would be willing to aggressively pursue all potential third party 
infringers in pursuit of that illusive certainty.  The certainty effect may be one of 
the motivating factors behind some of the “aggressive clients” mentioned by the 
trademark attorneys interviewed for Professor Gallagher’s study of informal 
trademark and copyright enforcement efforts.177 
 
 173. Babcock, Farber, Fobian & Shafir, supra note 166. 
 174. Id. 
 175. KAHNEMAN, supra note 141, at 312. 
 176. This is truly a fool’s errand, as there can never be certainty in such a situation.  There is 
always the possibility of a third party using your trademark “under the radar” of your various “watch 
services” and without federal registration.  There is also always the possibility that a new company will 
begin to use your trademark at any time, or that an unrelated company with the same or similar 
trademark could attempt to enter a marketplace similar to yours.  The risk of harm to your trademark 
cannot be completely removed. 
 177. Gallagher, supra note 34, at 480. 
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2.  The Endowment Effect 
The biased judgments stemming from the certainty bias discussed above are 
compounded when they interact with another cognitive bias called the endowment 
effect.  The endowment effect provides that an individual will value an item in his 
or her possession more than an equivalent item in the marketplace.  If the items in 
question are identical, and there are no transaction costs involved, then a rational 
decision maker should see no distinction between the two items.  However, studies 
of the endowment effect have shown that once a person claims ownership over an 
item, that person increases the item’s value in that person’s mind.178 
For example, in the classic study conducted by Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, 
and Richard Thaler, half of the study participants were given coffee mugs and told 
they would have the opportunity to sell them.179  The other half of the participants 
were told they would have the opportunity to buy the mugs.180  Then, each current 
“mug owner” and each “buyer” was asked to fill out a questionnaire indicating the 
prices at which that individual would be willing to buy or sell a mug.181  The mug 
owners consistently valued the mugs at a significantly higher price than the 
buyers.182  This suggests that despite not actually purchasing the mugs themselves, 
and having no direct personal connection to the mugs, the fact that the mug owners 
had been randomly assigned possession of the mugs increased the assessed value of 
the mugs to those individuals. 
The endowment effect can be seen as an expected consequence of prospect 
theory’s loss aversion.  From the perspective of prospect theory, the individuals 
buying and selling mugs are likely to base their decisions on a reference point that 
is the status quo.  For the study participants who were given a mug, their status quo 
includes possession of a mug.  Therefore, selling that mug can be seen as a loss 
since they are giving up the item in their possession now.  In terms of underlying 
psychology, such an individual may consider the pain of giving up the mug when 
mentally assessing the mug’s value.  That pain can consciously or unconsciously 
contribute to the increase in value ascribed to the mugs in this instance.  On the 
other hand, a buyer’s status quo is more neutral:  he or she does not currently have 
a mug.  Therefore, buying a mug can be seen as a gain, and the pleasure of that gain 
could be taken into account when setting the price for the mug.  According to 
Kahneman, “The values were unequal because of loss aversion:  giving up a 
[possession] is more painful than getting an equally good [item].”183  While not 
explicitly discussing prospect theory, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes has captured this same sentiment:   
 
 178. Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. 
ORGAN. 39 (1980). 
 179. Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 
98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325 (1990). 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. 
 183. KAHNEMAN, supra note 141, at 293. 
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It is in the nature of man’s mind.  A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your 
own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and 
cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, 
however you came by it.  The law can ask no better justification than the deepest 
instincts of man.184 
Additional studies have indicated that “endowment effects will almost certainly 
occur when owners are faced with the opportunity to sell an item purchased for use 
that is not easily replaceable.”185  Given the unique nature of trademarks and the 
fact that they cannot easily be bought or sold on an open market,186 they are in a 
sense irreplaceable; consequently, a strong endowment effect should be expected 
to impact decisions of trademark owners.  Trademark owners will have a strong 
incentive to avoid losing what they have—their current trademark and the goodwill 
associated with it.  This suggests that trademark owners may overvalue their 
trademark assets and then invest irrationally large amounts of time and money into 
preventing a loss of those trademarks, even if such a loss is incredibly unlikely.  
Professor Gallagher’s interviews with trademark attorneys show hints of the 
endowment effect at play in decision making regarding trademarks and the duty to 
police:  “As these lawyers explained, enforcement efforts were much more likely to 
be undertaken against potential targets when the alleged infringement involved the 
client’s ‘core’ IP, or ‘crown jewels,’ as several lawyers put it.”187  Calling the 
trademarks “crown jewels,” or viewing them as on par with tangible property,188 
illustrates the tendency of trademark owners to elevate the status of trademarks to 
something more significant than mere business assets.  The inherent nature of 
trademarks lends itself easily to the errors associated with the endowment effect.  
Since this psychological effect can impact rational decision making, it should be 
taken into consideration by anyone seeking to deter trademark bullying.  
Trademark bullying behavior should be expected in light of the endowment effect’s 
interaction with the uncertain requirements of trademark law’s duty to police. 
3.  The Sunk Cost Effect 
The sunk cost effect—the observed greater tendency of an individual to 
“continue an endeavor once an investment of money, effort or time has been 
 
 184. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897). 
 185. See Kahneman et al., supra note 180, at 1344. 
 186. Because a trademark should represent the consistent quality of a product as produced by a 
specific source, a trademark cannot be sold “in gross” without the goodwill of the business that it 
represents.  MCCARTHY, supra note 75, § 18:2; see also Mister Donut of America, Inc. v. Mr. Donut, 
Inc., 418 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1969) (“The law is well settled that there are no rights in a trademark alone 
and that no rights can be transferred apart from the business with which the mark has been associated.”), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 646 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1980).  
 187. Gallagher, supra note 34, at 476. 
 188. Id. at 491 (“Several lawyers characterized unauthorized copying as ‘theft’ of property.  One 
lawyer explained that copyrighted work was ‘their (the client’s) property, their baby,’ which this lawyer 
stated should justify the client’s decision to enforce IP rights as aggressively as necessary in order to 
protect its property interests.”). 
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made”189—is another factor that may exacerbate the problem of trademark 
bullying.  This behavior is motivated by the prior investment, known as the sunk 
cost, despite the fact that such investment objectively should be irrelevant to 
decisions about future behavior if the decision were based on rational choice 
theory.  The sunk cost effect has been used to explain numerous examples of 
horrible financial decisions made by government agencies or even private 
corporations where additional funds continue to be contributed to a project or 
research program that has proven to be a failure.190 
One study exploring behavioral ramifications of the sunk cost effect used full 
price and discounted theater ticket packages to evaluate the effect under real world 
conditions.  In that study, individuals seeking to buy season ticket packages to a 
specific theater were randomly assigned to groups and either offered the option of 
purchasing the tickets at full price or at one of several discounted prices (allegedly 
offered as part of various promotions).191  By tracking attendance of these 
individuals over the course of the season, the researchers were able to show that 
those individuals that purchased the full price tickets, and thus had higher sunk 
costs, were more likely to use their tickets in the six months following the ticket 
sales.192  If the sunk cost effect was not at work, the researchers predicted that the 
individuals in the various test groups should have been equally likely to attend a 
performance.193  This is what rational choice theory would have anticipated.  Also 
noteworthy was the fact that the sunk cost effect seemed to last only six months,194 
which could be the period in which the purchase price of the tickets was most 
salient to the buyer.  After six months, there was no difference in attendance rates 
between the theatergoers who purchased at full price and those who purchased with 
a discount.195 
Now imagine that one of the study’s theatergoers went to his first show of the 
season and hated the performance.  He felt the cast and crew were untalented and 
that the show was a waste of his time.  If that individual is persuaded to continue 
attending shows due to the sunk cost of the tickets already purchased, he would not 
be maximizing his happiness (as he dislikes the performances) or his productivity 
(since he could choose an alternate activity).  To a rational choice theorist, he is 
“throwing good money after bad.”  Yet, examples of this sort of irrational behavior 
abound:  the most famous perhaps is the supersonic Concorde airplane, where two 
governments developing the plane decided to continue development even when 
there was little chance of recouping costs.  Their rationale was that they had “too 
much invested to quit.”196  This “Concorde fallacy”—refusing to cut one’s losses—
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appears to be unique to adult humans (not children or lower animals).197 
While the sunk cost effect may not explain why trademark bullies take their 
initial aggressive actions against third parties, it might account for why these 
disputes can rapidly escalate into costly litigation.  In the case of the “Charbucks” 
dispute, the endowment effect may have contributed to Jim Clark’s decision not to 
capitulate immediately to the demands from Starbucks.  However, that effect alone 
fails to explain why Clark continued to pay attorney’s fees and dedicate time and 
effort to this dispute in the years leading up to the filing of the suit by Starbucks. 
Clark has indicated that his costs quickly approached $20,000, a large sum for such 
a small business.  While Clark had hoped Starbucks would pay his legal fees as part 
of the proposed settlement agreement, he had no guarantee of this from Starbucks.  
The only guaranteed way to stop incurring costs would have been to cease use of 
the “Charbucks” trademark.  But the $20,000 in fees did not occur all at once.  
Instead, it built up in small increments; each increment adding more to Clark’s 
sunk costs and further encouraging to insist that Starbucks agree to his settlement 
terms. 
At the same time, Starbucks experienced its own escalation of sunk costs.  At 
the time of final negotiation between the parties, after which Clark refused to 
continue negotiating and Starbucks filed suit, Starbucks refused to pay more than 
$20,000 to Clark to cover his expenses related to their settlement discussions.  Both 
parties had invested so much in sunk costs that $20,000 no longer seemed like a 
rational offer to Clark.  At trial, however, Starbucks presented a $30,000 consumer 
opinion survey as evidence.  The company was now willing to invest $30,000 on 
top of the sunk costs invested in the negotiation discussions and projected costs of 
ongoing litigation, when that same $30,000 might have allowed them to reach 
settlement only a short while before.  This escalation of the dispute may be 
attributable to the sunk costs effect.  In order to deter such expensive and inefficient 
methods of dispute resolution, those crafting solutions must recognize that 
psychological mechanisms may motivate the parties involved and affect their 
decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of loss aversion and the related cognitive biases discussed in this Article, 
it may be necessary to rethink how we best respond to trademark bullying and its 
negative consequences.  While some attorneys and scholars have proposed that this 
problem could be addressed with existing ethics laws or the expansion of 
antiSLAPP measures allowing defendants to seek damages for meritless suits, these 
solutions are premised on an understanding of a trademark bully as a rational 
decision maker.  The lack of clarity in the law regarding the duty to police third 
party trademark usage encourages trademark owners to be risk seeking and 
aggressive in order to avoid the small possibility of a finding of trademark 
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abandonment.  An attorney counseling such clients cannot say with certainty that 
there is no risk.  Thus, he or she will be less likely to worry about violating ethical 
rules by pushing aggressively on a client’s behalf to stop third party trademark 
usage.  Any remedial measures designed to punish an overly aggressive trademark 
bully would occur after the impulse to avoid loss has already induced bully-like 
behavior.  Such measures may be able to encourage that specific trademark owner 
to respond less aggressively in the future, but are unlikely to deter other potential 
trademark bullies.  Bullies’ initial motivations are not based solely on a rational 
cost-benefit analysis, and effective deterrents cannot assume that they are.  The 
same problem exists with the proposal to deter trademark bullying through the use 
of extralegal “shaming” measures.  Given mark owners’ high degree of loss 
aversion, in the context of a overvalued trademark (due to the endowment effect) 
the negative consequences of shaming would likely need to be substantial and 
direct in order to affect the incentives to bully in the first place.  Such a deterrent 
would add more “costs” to a cost-benefit analysis but would not go to the heart of 
the potential cognitive motivations of a trademark bully. 
A more direct approach is needed, focusing on increasing clarity with regard to 
the risk of trademark abandonment.  As this risk appears to be relatively slight, the 
USPTO may be able to counter the overestimation of risk through better guidance 
and outreach to trademark owners.  In advising clients, attorneys have traditionally 
framed the issue of the duty to police as one of loss:  if you fail to stop potential 
third party infringement, your trademark can be lost forever.  The issue could be 
reframed, to better reflect the actual risk involved, as an issue of investment in 
one’s brand.  Attorneys could present it to clients as the duty of the trademark 
owner to ensure that the mark continues to serve as a source identifier.  Part of this 
duty is to invest in quality control and advertising.  Part of it is to monitor 
consumer usage to ensure that the mark is not falling into generic usage.  Finally, 
the duty entails monitoring competitors to make sure the lines between the client’s 
trademark and the competitor’s remain distinct.  Such a conception gives the power 
back to the trademark owner to view the duty as a way to invest in the trademark 
rather than a loss-oriented position where the only goal is to avoid having a mark 
taken away.  Professor Irina Manta has proposed a USPTO-based registry of C&D 
letters, through which the merits of claims can be given a brief but official analysis, 
as a means of increasing clarity in this uncertain area of the law.198  While this also 
hints at the idea of “shaming,” or deterrence through disclosure, it addresses the 
core issue of risk assessment by making more data available to trademark owners.  
Increases in clarity that come about through changes to the Lanham Act, agency 
guidance from the USPTO or C&D letter evaluations could all help to bring more 
rationality to decisions about enforcing and protecting a trademark.  Any solution 
that fails to consider the potentially irrational cognitive mechanisms encouraging 
aggressive actions by trademark bullies is doomed to be ineffective.  Providing 
clarity about the true risk of loss due to abandonment is essential to addressing the 
trademark bullying problem. 
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